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A CONSENT THEORY OF CONTRACT
Randy E. Barnett*
INTRODUCTION
The mere fact that one man promises something to an-
other creates no legal duty and makes no legal remedy avail-
able in case of non-performance. To be enforceable, the
promise must be accompanied by some other factor .... The
question now to be discussed is what is this other factor. What
fact or facts must accompany a promise to make it enforceable
at law?'
We look to legal theory to tell us when the use of legal force
against an individual is morally2 justified. We look to contract theory,
in particular, to tell us which interpersonal commitments the law ought
to enforce. Contract theory at present, however, does not provide a
satisfactory answer to this question. The five best known theories or
principles of contractual obligation-the will theory, the reliance the-
ory, the fairness theory, the efficiency theory and the bargain theory-
each have very basic shortcomings. A consent theory of contract avoids
these difficulties while explaining coherent obligation in a plausible and
coherent manner.
Theories are problem-solving devices. We assess the merits of a
particular theory by its ability to solve the problems that gave rise to the
need for a theory. We do not, however, assess a particular theory in a
vacuum. No theory in any discipline, from physics to biology to philos-
ophy, can be expected to solve every problem raised by the discipline.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law. B.A. Northwestern University, 1974; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1977. An
earlier version of this Article was presented to the Law and Society Association Annual
Meeting, Denver, Colorado in June of 1983. I wish to thank the following people for
their most helpful comments on various precursors of this Article: Larry Alexander,
Douglas Baird, Mary Becker, Stuart Deutsch, Frank Easterbrook, Richard Epstein,
George Fletcher, R.H. Helmholz, A.W.B. Simpson, Geoffrey Stone, Cass Sunstein, Law-
rence H. White, Christopher Wonnell, and Richard W. Wright. I also thank my research
assistants, Sharyl Schwartz and William Walsh. I am grateful to the University of Chi-
cago Law School, where I began this paper as a Research Fellow, and to the Institute for
Humane Studies at George Mason University and the Veritas Fund for the financial sup-
port that made my stay at the University of Chicago possible. Finally, I wish to thank my
colleagues at LI.T Chicago-Kent College of Law and my Dean, Lewis Collens, for pro-
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1. 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 110, at 490 (1963); see also Eisenberg, The
Principles of Consideration, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 640, 640 (1982) ("A promise, as such, is
not legally enforceable. The first great question of contract law, therefore, is what kinds
of promises should be enforced.").
2. The view that morality plays an important role in legal theory is discussed infra
notes 109-I1 and accompanying text.
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Rather, we compare contending theories to see which theory handles
problems the best.
Our criteria for comparing theories include at least three factors:
(a) the number of known problems the theory handles as well or better
than its rivals, (b) the centrality of the problems that the theory handles
well, and (c) the promise that the theory offers for solving future
problems. When we assess legal theories, the better a particular theory
explains cases where we are confident of the right outcome, the more
confident we will be with the answers it suggests for those cases at the
margin where our intuitions are less secure.
In Part I of this Article, the five most popular theories of contrac-
tual obligation will be assessed. Each of these theories accurately cap-
tures some aspect of contractual obligation. However, the current lack
of a consensus concerning the proper basis of contractual obligation
suggests that each approach has fundamental weaknesses. The theories
can be grouped into three distinct types: party-based, standards-based,
and process-based theories. At least part of each theory's weakness
stems from deficiencies that are inherent in its type. The purpose of
this comparative analysis will be to demonstrate the need for a more
overarching approach that can capture the truths of these theories
while avoiding their errors.
In Part II, a consent theory of contract 3 will be described and ap-
plied to the problems identified in Part I. A consent theory posits that
contractual obligation cannot be completely understood unless it is
viewed as part of a broader system of legal entitlements. Such a system,
based in morality,4 specifies the substance of the rights individuals may
acquire and transfer, and the means by which they may do so. Properly
understood, contract law is that part of a system of entitlements that
identifies those circumstances in which entitlements are validly trans-
ferred from person to person by their consent. Consent is the moral
component that distinguishes valid from invalid transfers of alienable
rights.
A consent theory of contract explains why we generally take an
"objective" approach to contractual intent and why we deviate from
this approach in some situations. In addition, a consent theory vali-
dates the enforcement of certain commitments where no bargained-for
exchange exists-such as those supported by "nominal considera-
3. I first discussed the consent theory of contract in Barnett, Contract Scholarship
and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy (Book Review), 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1223 (1984),
where I also attempted to place recent developments in legal philosophy in a historical
context to explain the resurgence of normative legal philosophy in general and entitle-
ment theories in particular.
4. The theory presented by this Article is based in, and required by, the normative
requirements of morality. See infra notes 109-28 and accompanying text. Nonetheless,
readers who favor a positivist perspective may wish to consider the requirement of con-
sent solely as a means of understanding past and present judicial decisions, and of rec-
onciling apparently conflicting doctrines.
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tion"-and thereby rescues these useful legal arrangements from their
present uncertain status in contract law. By providing a clear, com-
mon-sense test of enforceability that avoids the need for courts to dis-
tinguish "reasonable" from "unreasonable" reliance in determining
whether a contract was formed, a consent theory enables parties to cal-
culate better who bears the risk of reliance and, hence, facilitates reli-
ance on interpersonal commitments. Finally, a consent theory's
account of contractual obligation explains and justifies the historically
recognized defenses to contractual obligation.
I. ASSESSING CURRENT THEORIES OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
Five theories-the will, reliance, efficiency, fairness, and bargain
theories 5-are most commonly offered to explain which commitments
merit enforcement and which do not. These theories of contractual ob-
ligation actually exemplify three types of contract theories. Will and
reliance theories are party-based. Efficiency and fairness theories are
standards-based. The bargain theory is process-based. At least some of
each theory's weaknesses are characteristics of its type. For this reason,
each type of theory shall be separately considered here.
The criticisms presented in this section are neither comprehensive
nor particularly novel. Rather, the discussion will identify the main
problems that most theorists have acknowledged attach to each theory.
The object here is not to refute any of these approaches. Instead, the
aim will be to demonstrate that none provides a comprehensive theory
of contractual obligation.
Will, reliance, efficiency, fairness, and bargain are best understood
as core concerns of contract law. A theory of contractual obligation is
needed to provide a framework that specifies when one of these con-
cerns should give way to another.6 Their proper relationship cannot be
explained by a theory based solely on any one concern or on some un-
specified combination. In Part II, I will explain how a consent theory of
contract provides this necessary framework.
A. Party-Based Theories
Theories described here as party-based are those that focus on
protecting one particular party to a transaction. A more accurate
(though more awkward) label is "one-sided party-based." Will theories
5. When an explanation of contractual obligation focuses exclusively on one of
these factors, that factor may be identified as forming the basis of a distinct theoy-as in
"will theory." When two or more factors are combined, then they may more accurately
be referred to as principles-as in "reliance principle"--or as core concerts of a more gen-
eral theory of contractual obligation.
6. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note I, at 642-43 (favoring an expansive conception of con-
tractual obligation "that recognizes the enforceability of promises on the basis of vari-
ous elements, and directs inquiry toward determining those elements while fashioning
principles that reflect them in an appropriate way").
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are primarily concerned with protecting the promisor. Reliance theo-
ries are primarily concerned with protecting the promisee. The undue
emphasis that the will and reliance theories each place on one specific
party creates insoluble problems for each approach.
1. Will Theories. - Will theories maintain that commitments are en-
forceable because the promisor has "willed" or chosen to be bound by
his commitment. "According to the classical view, the law of contract
gives expression to and protects the will of the parties, for the will is
something inherently worthy of respect. ' 7 In this approach, the use of
force against a reneging promisor is morally justified because the
promisor herself has warranted the use of force by her prior exercise of
will. A promisor cannot complain about force being used against her,
since she intended that such force could be used when she made the
commitment.8
Will theories depend for their moral force upon the notion that
contractual duties are binding because they are freely assumed by those
who are required to discharge them. Consequently, enforcement is not
morally justified without a genuine commitment by the person who is
to be subjected to a legal sanction. This position leads quite naturally
to an inquiry as to the promisor's actual state of mind at the time of
agreement-the so-called "subjective" viewpoint. After all, the theory
can hardly be based on will if the obligation was not chosen by the indi-
vidual but instead was imposed by law.
It has long been recognized that a system of contractual enforce-
ment would be unworkable if it adhered to a will theory requiring a
subjective inquiry into the putative promisor's intent.9 Where we can-
not discern the actual subjective intent or will of the parties, there is no
practical problem, since we assume it corresponds to objectively mani-
fested intentions. But where subjective intent can somehow be proved
and is contrary to objectively manifested behavior, subjective intent
should prevail if the moral integrity and logic of a will theory are to be
preserved.
Of course, any legal preference for the promisor's subjective intent
would disappoint a promisee who has acted in reliance on the appear-
7. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 575 (1933).
8. See C. Fried, Contract as Promise 16 (1981) ("An individual is morally bound to
keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is
to give grounds-moral grounds-for another to expect the promised performance.")
(emphasis added); see also Burrows, Contract, Tort and Restitution-A Satisfactory Di-
vision or Not?, 99 Law Q. Rev. 217, 258 (1983) ("It is the acceptance of an obligation
that is vital; it is not enough to have represented that facts are true or to have merely
declared that one is intending to do something, for in such situations, the will has not
committed itself to do anything."). Anthony T. Kronman also categorizes Professor
Fried as a "will theorist." See Kronman, A New Champion for the Will Theory (Book
Review), 91 Yale L.J. 404, 404 (1981). For a comparison of Professor Fried's will theory
with a consent theory, see infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 7, at 575-78; Burrows, supra note 8, at 258.
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ance of legally binding intent.' 0 Permitting a subjective inquiry into
the promisor's intent could also enable a promisor to fraudulently un-
dermine otherwise perfectly clear agreements by generating and pre-
serving extrinsic evidence of ambiguous or conflicting intentions. Such
a strategy might create a de facto option in the promisor. The prom-
isor could insist on enforcement if the contract continued to be in her
interest, but if it were no longer advantageous, she could avoid the con-
tract, by producing evidence of a differing subjective intent."I
Because the subjective approach relies on evidence inaccessible to
the promisee, much less to third parties, an inquiry into subjective in-
tent would undermine the security of transactions by greatly reducing
the reliability of contractual commitments.1 2 Not surprisingly, and
notwithstanding the logic of obligation based on "will," the objective
approach has largely prevailed.13 The subjectivist moral component,
on which a will theory focuses to justify legal enforcement, conflicts
unavoidably with the practical need for a system of rules based to a
large extent on objectively manifested states of mind. While a person's
objective manifestations generally reflect subjective intentions, a will
theorist must explain the enforcement of the objective agreement
where it can be shown that the subjective understanding of a party dif-
fers from her objectively manifested behavior.
Some will theorists uneasily resolve this conflict by acknowledging
that other "interests"-for example, reliance-may take priority over
10. See D. Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 30 n.5 (C.
Hendel ed. 1957) (1st ed. 1751):
If the secret direction of the intention, said every man of sense, could invalidate
a contract, where is our security? And yet a metaphysical schoolman might
think, that where an intention was supposed to be requisite, if that intention
really had no place, no consequence ought to follow, and no obligation be
imposed.
11. For an interesting example of a court suspecting a similar strategy by a party
attempting to exploit the "mailbox rule," see Cohen v. Clayton Coal Co., 86 Colo. 270,
281 P. 111 (1929).
12. Note that neither the problem of reliance nor the problem of fraud would arise
when a promisor, who manifested an intention to be bound, seeks to avoid liability by
showing that the promisee did not actually or "subjectively" understand the promisor's
actions to have this meaning. It provides few opportunities for fraud to permit the
promisor to avoid liability by proving that the promisee understood the behavior as it
was subjectively intended by the promisor and that consequently the promisee did not
rely on the promisor's outward manifestation. Such a "subjective" inquiry, however
rarely it might arise, is therefore quite properly permitted under a conventional objec-
tive approach. See, e.g., Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 127 Mo. App.
383, 385, 105 S.W. 777, 779 (1907). As will be discussed below, see infra notes 156-60
and accompanying text, this position is also in harmony with a consent theory of
contract.
13. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J., concurring); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 comment b (1979); E.
Farnsworth, Contracts § 3.6, at 114 (1982).
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the will. 14 By permitting individuals to be bound by promises never
intended by them to be enforceable, such a concession deprives a will
theory of much of its force. Requiring the promisor's subjective will to
yield always, or almost always, to the promisee's reliance on the prom-
isor's objective manifestation of assent undermines the claim that con-
tractual obligation is grounded in the individual's will' 5 and bolsters
the view that contractual obligations may be imposed rightfully on un-
willing parties. 16 The inability of will theories to explain adequately the
enforcement of objective manifestations of intention also accounts in
part for the continued interest in reliance-based theories of contractual
obligation.
2. Reliance Theories. - Theories that explain contractual obligation
as an effort to protect a promisee's reliance on the promises of others
have the apparent virtue of explaining why persons may be bound by
the common meaning of their words regardless of their intentions.
Thus, it has become increasingly fashionable to assert that contractual
obligation is created by reliance on a promise. 17 A reliance theory is
based upon the intuition that we ought to be liable in contract law for
our assertive behavior when it creates "foreseeable" or "justifiable" re-
liance in others, in much the same way that we are held liable in tort law
for harmful consequences of other acts.' 8
Reliance theories have nonetheless faced a seemingly insuperable
14. See, e.g., C. Fried, supra note 8, at 58-63 (acknowledging that a failure to agree
subjectively deprives a contract of its moral force on a will- or promise-based theory, but
asserting that recovery may be available on other principles of "fairness," "encourage-
ment of due care," or concerns of "administration").
15. See Burrows, supra note 8, at 258; see also D. Hume, supra note 10, at 30 n.5
("The expression being once brought in as subservient to the will, soon becomes the
principal part of the promise .... ").
16. See P. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 6 (1979); see also
Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 829, 834 (1983)
("[C]ontract law is like tort law and judicial action is like legislative action: all necessar-
ily involve public policyjudgments in imposing legal liability."). But see Eisenberg, The
Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 785 n.121 (1982) (taking issue
with Atiyah's analysis of reliance-based obligation).
17. While the literature is replete with suggestions about "the reliance principle," a
comprehensive reliance theory of contract has never been systematically presented.
Such an approach clearly underlies Gilmore's seminal work, The Deatlh of Colract. See,
e.g., G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract 71-72, 88 (1974). Atiyah appears to call for a
reliance theory, although he also acknowledges that "the voluntary creation and extinc-
tion of rights and liabilities" should remain one of the "basic pillars of the law of obliga-
tions." P. Atiyah, supra note 16, at 779; see also Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and
Judicial Method, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 678, 716-17 (1984) ("reliance principle" undermines
"classical" contract law doctrines); Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional
Contract Doctrine, 78 Yale L.J. 343, 344 (1969) (rules of promissory estoppel create a
contract grounded on effects of reliance).
18. See G. Gilmore, supra note 17, at 88 ("We may take the fact that damages in
contract have become indistinguishable from damages in tort as obscurely reflecting an
instinctive, almost unconscious realization that the two fields, which had been artificially
set apart, are gradually merging and becoming one.").
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difficulty. As Morris Cohen wrote as early as 1933: "Clearly, not all
cases of injury resulting from reliance on the word or act of another are
actionable, and the theory before us offers no clue as to what distin-
guishes those which are."19 This deficiency has led necessarily to the
employment of such phrases as "justifiable" reliance or "reasonable"
reliance.20 These adjectives, however, depend on (usually vague) stan-
dards of evaluation that are unrelated to reliance itself, because,
whether justified or unjustified, reasonable or unreasonable, reliance is
present in any event.
Furthermore, whether a person has "reasonably" relied on a
promise depends on what most people would (or ought to) do. We
cannot make this assessment independently of the legal rule in effect in
the relevant community, because what many people would do in reli-
ance on a promise is crucially affected by their perception of whether or
not the promise is enforceable. A reliance theory, therefore, ultimately
does no more than pose the crucial question that it is supposed to an-
swer: is this a promise that should be enforced?
The analysis is no different if we ask whether the promisor knew or
had reason to know the promise would induce others to act in reli-
ance,2 1 even though this formulation lessens a reliance theory's prefer-
ence for the promisee's interests. Unlike the subject of the prediction
required by foreseeability analysis in tort law-the physical conse-
quences that follow from physical actions-the subject of the predic-
tion required by forseeability analysis in contract law is the actions of a
self-conscious person. A prediction that a promise can reasonably be
expected to induce reliance by a promisee or third party will unavoid-
ably depend upon whether the promisee or third party believes that
reliance will be legally protected. The legal rule itself cannot be formu-
lated based on such a prediction, however, without introducing a prac-
tical circularity into the analysis. 22
Furthermore, if a promise is defined, as in the Restatement (Sec-
19. Cohen, supra note 7, at 579.
20. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 656-59; Henderson, supra note 17, at 345.
21. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1979). Section 90 quali-
fies reliance-based recoveries at the level of formation, by requiring both a "reasonable"
expectation of reliance and the imposition of sanctions only if "injustice" cannot other-
wise be avoided, and, at the level of remedies, by limiting the remedy "as justice re-
quires." Id. Traditionally, however, the legal method employs doctrinal and theoretical
analysis (that is consistent with underlying notions of justice) to discover where justice
resides in a particular case. See Barnett, Why We Need Legal Philosophy, 8 Harv.J.L. &
Pub. Pol. 6-10 (1985). Section 90 obviously begs this question. While it may have been
the victim of overly cautious draftsmanship, no more precise formulations have been
offered to take its place.
22. This appears to be an example of what George Fletcher has characterized as a
"paradox of legal thought." See Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 Colum. L.
Rev. 1263 (1985). If so, it will be resolved only by finding a basis independent of fore-
seeability on which to distinguish legally protected from legally unprotected reliance.
See id. at 1269 ("When a paradox is uncovered, we can restore consistency in our legal
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ond) of Contracts, as "a manifestation of intention to act or refrain
from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in un-
derstanding that a commitment has been made,"'23 then it would seem
that every promisor should reasonably expect to induce reliance. If so,
"The real issue is not whether the promisor should have expected the
promisee to rely, but whether the extent of the promisee's reliance was
reasonable." 24 But this returns us once again to the difficulties of dis-
cerning "reasonable" reliance.
By providing an overly expansive criterion of contractual obliga-
tion, any theory that bases obligation on detrimental reliance begs the
basic question to be resolved by contract theory: which potentially reli-
ance-inducing actions entail legal consequences and which do not? A
person's actions in reliance on a commitment are not justified-and
therefore legally protected-simply because she has relied. Rather, reli-
ance on the words of others is legally protected because of some as yet
undefined circumstances .25
In short, a person, rather than being entitled to legal enforcement
because reliance is justified, is justified in relying on those commit-
ments that will be legally enforced. Reliance theories therefore must
appeal to a criterion other than reliance to distinguish justified acts of
reliance. Such a criterion has yet to be identified. It is suggested be-
low2 6 that a consent theory provides such a criterion.
3. The Problem With Party-Based Theories. - These difficulties reveal
that reliance theories have much in common with will theories. Both
sets of theories must resort to definitions of contractual enforcement
that do not follow from either will or reliance, but are based on more
fundamental principles that are left unarticulated. By failing to distin-
guish adequately between those commitments that are worthy of legal
protection and those that are not, both the will and reliance theories
have failed in their basic mission. Consequently, actual contract cases
must be resolved ad hoc using vague concepts such as "reasonable-
structures . . . by finding or constructing a distinction . . . that dissolves the
paradox.").
23. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 (1979). Note that the Restatement's
definition of promise differs from the definition of "consent" offered below, infra notes
121, 143-44 and accompanying text, in that consent is limited to a particular kind of
commitment-a commitment to be legally bound.
24. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 659.
25. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, the increased recognition of reliance-based
recovery exemplified by § 90 of the Restatement may have been, on balance, more help-
ful than harmful to the cause of freedom of contract. Recovery purportedly based on
reliance provides a gap-filling safety valve for cases involving nonbargained-for reliance
and thereby enables the market oriented bargain requirement to survive. See E. Farns-
worth, supra note 13, § 2.19, at 89 ("The failure of the doctrine of consideration to
provide a more satisfactory basis for enforcing such promises might have brought
greater pressure to reform the doctrine had it not been for the increasing recognition of
reliance as an alternative ground for recovery.").
26. See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
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ness" or "public policy," or by employing clearer but formalistic crite-
ria such as "consideration."
Each theory primarily focuses on protecting one side of a contrac-
tual transaction: will theories focus on respecting the intentions of the
promisor, while reliance theories focus on correcting the injury to the
promisee. As a result, neither can properly assess the interrelational
quality of the process of contracting. The law of contract exists to facil-
itate transactions between persons. In such an enterprise, there is no
obvious reason why either party should be automatically preferred.
While subjective intentions and reliance costs are important to a proper
understanding of contractual obligation, something more basic is miss-
ing in theories of contractual obligation the primary focus of which is
on only one of these core concerns.
Ironically, though both will and reliance theories assume a strongly
moralistic stance-protecting "autonomy" or remedying "injuries"-
neither provides an adequate moral framework to explain the legal en-
forcement of contracts. Both theories fail in this way because both at-
tempt to explain contractual obligation in a theoretical vacuum. In
liberal political and legal theory, the interrelational quality of social life
is facilitated by identifying the entitlements or property rights of indi-
viduals in society. Theories that focus exclusively on the will of promis-
ors or the reliance of promisees fail to utilize this conceptual
framework. Not surprisingly, attempts to explain contractual obliga-
tions arising between persons go awry when those attempts ignore the
foundations of interpersonal legal relationships.
B. Standards-Based Theories
Standards-based theories are those which evaluate the substance of a
contractual transaction to see if it conforms to a standard of evaluation
that the theory specifies as primary. Economic efficiency and substan-
tive fairness are two such standards that have received wide attention.
1. Efficiency Theories. - One of the most familiar standards-based
legal theories is the efficiency approach associated with the "law and
economics" school.2 7 Economic efficiency is viewed by some in this
school as the maximization of some concept of social wealth or welfare:
"the term efficiency will refer to the relationship between the aggregate
benefits of a situation and the aggregate costs of the situation. . . . In
other words, efficiency corresponds to 'the size of the pie.' "28 Accord-
ing to this view, legal rules and practices are assessed to see whether
27. For a brief discussion of the role this school has played in provoking recent
jurisprudential developments, see Barnett, supra note 3, at 1229-33.
28. A. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 7 (1983); cf. Cooter & Ei-
senberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1432, 1460 (1985) ("Econo-
mists say that a contract is efficient if its terms maximize the value that can be created by
the contemplated exchange.").
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they will expand or contract the size of this pie.29
In its least assertive variation, an economic assessment of law does
not constitute a distinct theory of contractual obligation. Rather, eco-
nomic analysis of legal rules is simply viewed as a "value-free" scientific
inquiry that is confined to accounting for or explaining the conse-
quences that result from particular legal rules or schemes.30 So viewed,
economic analysis is not a competing theory of contractual obligation,
but only one of many yardsticks for assessing competing legal theories.
Economic analysis may also be viewed as a normative theory of
law 3 1-that is, economic efficiency is seen as providing the best or only
yardstick of law.3 2 However, because standard economic analysis be-
gins by assuming that some agreements are enforceable,33 normative
efficiency theories fail to provide a distinction between enforceable and
29. But cf. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 Hofstra L. Rev.
509, 512 (1980) ("Economists as well as proponents of the economic analysis of law
employ at least four efficiency-related notions, including: (1) Productive efficiency, (2)
Pareto optimality, (3) Pareto superiority, and (4) Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.").
30. See id. at 548-49. One strain of this mode of economics-sometimes called
"positive economics"-judges the efficacy of an economic explanation by its ability to
generate hypotheses that can be verified by empirical research. For explanations of this
methodology, see M. Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays in
Positive Economics 3 (1953); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 12-13, 17-19 (2d ed.
1977). For applications of the methodology, see e.g., Posner & Landes, Legal Change,
Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9J. Legal Stud. 367 (1980); Priest, Se-
lective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1980). For criticisms of the
methodology, see O'Driscoll, Justice, Efficiency, and the Economic Analysis of Law: A
Comment on Fried, 9 J. Legal Stud. 355 (1980); Rizzo, Can There Be a Principle of
Explanation in Common Law Decisions? A Comment on Priest, 9 J. Legal Stud. 423
(1980).
31. See Coleman, supra note 29, at 549; see also Posner, A Reply to Some Recent
Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the Common Law, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 775 (1981)
("The normative branch of the theory asserts that [promoting efficient resource alloca-
tion] ... is what judges should try to do in deciding common law cases."). But cf. id. at
779 (Posner's denial that normative analysis is his "primary interest").
32. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 30; R. Posner, The Economics ofJustice (1981).
Some normative analysts straddle this distinction by asserting that other concerns-for
example, distributive concerns-are normatively important as well. See, e.g., Calabresi,
About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 553 (1980);
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
From the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). But see Dworkin, Why Efficiency? A
Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 563 (1980) (disputing
the coherence of "mixing" efficiency with distributive concerns in a normative analysis).
33. What these economists sometimes refer to as "market transactions," see, e.g.,
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 15 (1960) ("The argument has
proceeded up to this point on the assumption ... that there were no costs involved in
carrying out market transactions." (emphasis added)), are in fact contracts. See Cheung,
Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements, 12 J.L.
& Econ. 23 (1969) ("Every transaction involves a contract."); Furubotn & Pejovich,
Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10J. Econ. Liter-
ature 1137, 1141 (1972) ("[T]he standard competitive model envisions a special system
where one particular set of private property rights governs the use of all resources, and
where the exchange, policing and enforcement costs of contractual activities are zero.").
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unenforceable commitments.3 4 In a world of no transaction costs, it is
asserted, individual economizing behavior would-by means of mutu-
ally advantageous exchanges of entitlements-ensure that legal entitle-
ments are freely transferred to their highest value use.3 5 Because such
a hypothetical world presupposes enforceable exchanges of legal enti-
tlements, it cannot (without much more) tell us why or when some
promises are enforceable while others are not.
In a world of positive transaction costs, 3 6 economists who employ
a model of "perfect competition" wish to assess the extent to which
such costs block the movement of resources to their highest value use
and the ways that legal rules and remedies-including those defining
the background set of entitlements-can be altered to minimize such
"inefficiency. ' 3 7 Such an analysis, based on detecting deviations from
the background efficiency "norm" of initial entitlements and cost-free
exchanges, must ultimately rest on no more than an assumption that
such voluntary economizing exchanges are to some extent enforceable.
Typically, then, efficiency analyses focus on the real world problems of
forced exchanges (tort law) in an effort to make legal solutions to these
nonmarket transactions approximate market solutions as closely as pos-
sible.38 Efficiency analyses of voluntary exchanges (contract law) typi-
cally focus on issues other than the source of contractual obligation
itself, such as appropriate remedies and other enforcement mecha-
34. Of course, one could try to define "market transactions" so narrowly that the
concept of contract would be excluded. Cf. A. Kronman & R. Posner, The Economics
of Contract Law 3 (1979) ("One can talk about the principle or system of voluntary
exchange for quite some time before it becomes necessary to consider the role of con-
tracts and contract law in facilitating the process."). Such a restricted definition, how-
ever, is not warranted. In fact, it is not clear that the market mechanism will have its
supposed efficiency-producing effect without taking enforceable commitments into ac-
count in a much broader view of "market exchanges." See, e.g., Posner, Gratuitous
Promises in Economics and Law, 6J. Legal Stud. 411, 412 (1977) ("The approach taken
here is that a gratuitous promise, to the extent it actually commits the promisor to the
promised course of action ... creates utility for the promisor over and above the utility
to him of the promised performance."); see also infra notes 48-49 and accompanying
text.
35. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Re-
source, 13J.L. & Econ. 49, 50 (1970); see, e.g., Coase, supra note 33, at 15; cf. R. Pos-
ner, supra note 32, at 60 ("[T]he term 'value' in economics has generally referred to
value in exchange .... ").
36. See Coase, supra note 33, at 15:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is
that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the
contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely
costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be
carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost.
37. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 32, at 70; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 32,
at 1097.
38. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 30, at 11.
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nisms, 39 and assume, rather than demonstrate, the enforceability of all
voluntary commitments. 40 How we recognize voluntary commitments
that ought to be enforced, as opposed to mere social promises that are
not enforceable, is not generally discussed.
Moreover, some normative efficiency theories 41 generate addi-
tional problems. If we are to enforce only those real world agreements
that increase the overall wealth of society,42 then it must be either
claimed or assumed that a neutral observer (for example, an economist-
judge) has access to this information-that is, knows which agreements
increase wealth and which do not.43 Two problems arise from this as-
sumption or claim. The first concerns its truth. Can observers ever
have information about value-enhancing exchanges independent of the
demonstrated preferences of the market participants? More impor-
tantly, can a legal system practically base its decisions on such informa-
tion? It has been persuasively argued that such knowledge is simply
not available independently of the production of information by real
markets. 44 If it is not available, then it cannot provide workable criteria
39. See Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. Legal Stud. 35, 36
(1982). But cf. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 Va. L. Rev.
947, 968 (1982):
[The economic model provides no basis for an a priori conclusion about the
efficiency of passage of ownership at any given stage of a transaction. More-
over, the passage of ownership, a legal entitlement, cannot be separated analyt-
ically (except for analyzing transaction costs and the kinds of issues raised by
Calabresi and Melamed) from remedies for breach of contract.
40. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 32, at 88-115 (discussing the "ethical and polit-
ical basis of wealth maximization"). Other economists would use a more restrictive
Pareto criterion of efficiency. See Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philo-
sophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 221, 226-31 (1980).
42. Cf. Posner, supra note 34, at 415 ("The question whether it is economical for
society to recognize a promise as legally enforceable thus requires a comparison of util-
ity of the promise to the promisor with the social cost of enforcing the promise." (cita-
tion omitted)).
43. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 32, at 62 ("The purist would insist that the
relevant values are unknowable since they have not been revealed in an actual market
transaction, but I believe that in many cases a court can make a reasonably accurate
guess as to the allocation of resources that would maximize wealth."); id. at 79 ("The
'interpersonal comparison of utilities' is anathema to the modern economist, and rightly
so, because there is no metric for making such a comparison. But the interpersonal
comparison of values, in the economic sense, is feasible, although difficult, even when
the values are not being compared in an explicit market.").
44. See, e.g., Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights, 9J.L. & Econ. 61, 67-68
(1966); Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 641, 648-51 (1980); Coleman,
The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner's The
Economics ofJustice (Book Review), 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1109 n.6 (1982). The seminal
work in this area was done by Ludwig von Mises and F.A. Hayek. See, e.g., L. von Mises,
Socialism 137-42 (rev. ed. 1951) (discussing why "artifical markets" are not possible); F.
Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in Individualism and Economic Order 77,
77-78 (1948) ("The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to
allocate 'given' resources .... It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of
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to distinguish enforceable from unenforceable promises. 45
Assuming, however, that such knowledge is available, if we have
direct access to information sufficient to know whether particular ex-
changes are value enhancing or not, why bother with contract law at
all? Why not simply have a central authority use this knowledge to
transfer entitlements independently of the parties' agreement, particu-
larly given the fact that the need to reach agreements creates transac-
tion costs? Or, why not letjudges use this knowledge to ratify "efficient
thefts"-that is, give thieves the option of obtaining title to property
that they have taken from others without their consent, provided only
that the thief pays court-assessed damages equal to the value to the
victim of her property?46 Normative economists are barred by their as-
sumption about available information47 from responding that we need
the market to provide such information.
Observations provided by economic theory about the effects of
certain contract rules or principles on the efficient allocation of re-
sources may rightly influence our normative assessment of those rules
resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance
only these individuals know."); see alsoJ. Gray, Hayek on Liberty 40 (1984) (explaining
Hayek's thesis that the "impossibility of socialism ... derives from its neglect of the
epistenological functions of market institutions and processes" (emphasis in original)); D.
Lavoie, Rivalry and Central Planning 48-77 (1985) (describing Mises' contribution to
the "socialist calculation debate" of the 1930s).
45. Of course, after a forced exchange-whether a tort or breach of contract-has
occurred, a court may have no choice but to assess values as best it can. See, e.g., Muris,
Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The Relevance of Subjective Value,
12 J. Legal Stud. 379 (1983) (discussing compensation for subjectively measured dam-
ages that result from breaches of contracts); see also supra text accompanying note 38;
infra note 130. At issue here, however, is not how best to rectify forced exchanges, but
rather, why and which voluntary exchanges are legally enforceable. Therefore, it is ap-
propriate to ask the normative-efficiency advocate whether a court system empowered to
use an efficiency analysis can "outperform the market" in recognizing value-enhancing
exchanges. There is no evidence that this is possible, and good reason to think that it is
not: See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
46. Some economic analysts can be seen as coming perilously close to an "efficient
theft" position when positing the legitimacy of "efficient breaches" of contract. For
statements of the "efficient breach" position, see, e.g., A. Polinsky, supra note 28, at
29-32; R. Posner, supra note 30, at 88-93. But cf. Macneil, supra note 39 (criticizing an
efficient breach analysis from an entitlements perspective).
47. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. An economist might argue that
''marginal" value-enhancing adjustments can be made against a background of market
institutions. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 32, at 111. This position has been criti-
cized by Rizzo, supra note 44, at 651-54.
Normative theories can also be criticized as placing undue reliance on the "objec-
tive" as opposed to "subjective" concepts of cost. See, e.g., Rizzo, supra note 44, at 646
("The difficulty in measuring what we have every reason to believe are relevant variables
is not, however, an argument for disregarding them; rather, it demonstrates the essen-
tial limitations of the wealth-maximization criterion."). For an explanation of the differ-
ence between the two concepts of cost, see J. Buchanan, Cost and Choice 1-26 (1969);
Thirlby, The Subjective Theory of Value and Accounting "Costs," in L.S.E. Essays on
Cost 137 (1. Buchanan & G. Thirlby eds. 1981).
1986]
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
or principles, particularly when these effects are considered along with
the effects such rules and principles would have on private autonomy,
or "will," and on reliance. Most notably, the efficient allocation of re-
sources may require a market composed of consensual exchanges that
reveal and convey otherwise unobtainable information about personal
preferences and economic opportunities. 48 Economic analysis may,
therefore, suggest that demonstrated consent plays an important role
in the law of contract, provided that efficient allocation of resources is a
social activity that should be facilitated by a legal system.49 From this
perspective, the "transaction costs" created by a requirement of con-
sent are no worse from an efficiency standpoint than any other cost of
production. The costs of negotiating to obtain the consent of another
may be resources well-spent because such negotiations serve to reveal
valuable information.
Where the negotiating costs of obtaining consent become so high
as to bar exchanges thought to be desirable by observers, at least three
conclusions are possible. Each, however, argues against enforcing in-
voluntary transfers. First, in the absence of a consensual demonstra-
tion of preferences, we do not really know if the exchange is
worthwhile-value enhancing-or not.50 Second, the inefficiency of
government legal institutions that needlessly raise transaction costs
may be principally responsible for making these consensual transac-
tions prohibitively expensive. If so, then "government failure" and not
"market failure" may be responsible for preventing the exchange and
the appropriate response is to eliminate the true source of the ineffi-
48. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; cf. S. Cheung, The Theory of Share
Tenancy 64 (1969) ("[C]ompetition conglomerates knowledge from all potential own-
ers-the knowledge of alternative contractual arrangements and uses of the resource;
and transferability of property rights ensures that the most valuable knowledge will be
utilized."); Demsetz, supra note 44, at 65 ("[Insisting on voluntary consent tends to
produce information accuracy when many costs and benefits are known only by the indi-
viduals affected.").
49. The political theory embodied in normative economic analysis has been ques-
tioned by Ronald Dworkin. See Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 191
(1980); Dworkin, supra note 32. Other critical analyses can be found in Symposium on
Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 485 (1980); A Response to the Effi-
ciency Symposium, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 811 (1980).
50. This is true for two related reasons. The first is the epistemological problem
presented by the absence of consent. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. The
second-which follows from the first-is the effect that scarcity of goods has on an effi-
ciency analysis. Transaction costs include negotiating agreements (exchange costs) and
obtaining legal enforcement (police costs). Both can be viewed as necessary informa-
tion-revealing and security-enhancing components of a given transaction. Such costs
will be positive in a world of scarcity. Suppose that they exceed the potential gain from a
contract and the contract is therefore not made. Is this situation any more "nonop-
timal" than is the situation where the cost of any other scarce factor input-such as land
or labor-prevents a transaction? Cf. Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another
Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & Econ. 1, 4 (1969) ("To make [such an] assertion is to deny that
scarcity is relevant to optimality, a strange position for an economist.").
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ciency.5 1 Finally, when negotiation costs make consensual agreements
too expensive a means of obtaining the vital information about value,
several alternative ways exist to generate this information without ne-
gotiation-for example, by forming a new company or "firm," by merg-
ing one company with another, or by combining products into a single
package.5 2
In this analysis, demonstrated consent can be seen as playing an
important role in any effort to achieve economic or allocative efficiency.
Efficiency notions alone, however, cannot completely explain why cer-
tain commitments should be enforced unless it is further shown that eco-
nomic efficiency is the exclusive goal of a legal order. The attempt to
provide such a normative theory of wealth maximization, in the area of
contract law at least, is fundamentally flawed.5 3 In short, while the re-
quirement of consent is in general supported by efficiency arguments,
the normative justification for a consent theory of contract must be
more broadly based.
2. Substantive Fairness Theories. - Another standards-based school
of thought attempts to evaluate the substance of a transaction to see if
it is "fair." 54 Substantive fairness theories have a long tradition dating
back at least to the Christian "just price" theorists of the Middle Ages5 5
51. Cf. Cheung, supra note 33, at 42 ("[T]ransaction costs also depend on alterna-
tive legal arrangements. For example, the varying effectiveness of law enforcement, or
the varying corruptibility of courts, will affect the costs of transactions in the market
place."); Coase, supra note 33, at 28 ("The kind of situation which economists are prone
to consider as requiring corrective Government action is, in fact, often the result of
Government action."); Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7
J.L. & Econ. 11, 17 (1964) ("The value of what is being traded depends crucially on the
rights of action over the physical commodity and on how economically these rights are
enforced.").
52. See Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 390-91 (1937); Demsetz,
supra note 51, at 16.
53. For criticisms of normative economic analysis that extend beyond contract law,
see Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the Foundations of the Eco-
nomic Approach to Law, 94 Ethics 649 (1984); Coleman, supra note 44.
54. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 754 ("[T]he new paradigm [unconsciona-
bility] creates a theoretical framework that explains most of the limits that have been or
should be placed upon . . .[the bargain] principle, based on the quality of the bar-
gain.").
This substantive fairness approach should be distinguished from approaches that
focus on whether the contracting process is fair or unfair. See, e.g., Epstein, Unconscio-
nability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & Econ. 293 (1975) (distinguishing procedural
from substantive unconscionability); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Em-
peror's New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1967) (same).
55. See R. Ely, Outlines of Economics 827 (5th ed. 1930). But medieval just price
theory actually may have been more subjective and market oriented than most modern
commentators assume. See Dempsey, Just Price in a Functional Economy, 25 Am. Econ.
Rev. 471, 471, 474-76, 480-86 (1935) (more subjective); De Roover, The Concept of




and perhaps even to Aristotle. 56 Their modern incarnation in contract
law can be found in nineteenth century discussions of the "adequacy of
consideration" 5 7  and, more recently, in some treatments of
"unconscionability." 5 8
A substantive fairness theory assumes that a standard of value can
be found by which the substance of any agreement can be objectively
evaluated. 59 Such a criterion has yet to be articulated and defended.6 0
Without such a criterion, substantive fairness theories fall back on one
or both of two incomplete approaches. On the one hand, such theories
tend to focus all their attention on a small fraction of commitments-
those that are thought to be so "extreme" as to "shock the conscience"
of the courts.6 ' Most real world agreements are considered to be pre-
sumptively enforceable.6 2 On the other hand, such theories tend to be-
56. See, e.g., Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 125 (M. Ostwald trans. 1962):
Thus, if (1) proportional equality is established between the goods, and (2)
reciprocity effected, the fair exchange we spoke of will be realized. But if there
is no proportionality, the exchange is not equal and fair, and (the association of
the two will) not hold together.
The doubt expressed in the text as to whether this committed Aristotle to a "just price"
position reflects the fact that he may only be attempting here to explain exchange trans-
actions as a modem day economist would, rather than normatively assess the "justice"
of the exchange. Of course, such a distinction is itself foreign to Aristotle's system.
57. See, e.g., Richardson v. Barrick, 16 Iowa 407,412 (1864); T.P. Shepard & Co. v.
Rhodes, 7 R.I. 470 (1863).
58. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 comment c (1979) ("Theo-
retically it is possible for a contract to be oppressive taken as a whole, even though there
is no weakness in the bargaining process .... ").
59. Cohen noted this problem with what he called "the equivalent theory" of con-
tract. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 581 (Due to problems of measurement, modern law
"professes to abandon the effort of more primitive systems to enforce material fairness
within the contract. The parties to the contract must themselves determine what is
fair."). As a purely descriptive matter, the idea that exchange occurs because goods are
of "equivalent" or equal value captivated economists for centuries, see supra notes
55-56 and accompanying text, until it was shown to be quite false. In fact, exchange
occurs because both parties ex ante perceive the value of the goods to be exchanged as
unequal. Each subjectively perceives the good or service offered by the other to be of
greater value (to an unknowable extent) than what they are willing to trade for it. See C.
Menger, Principles of Economics 180 (J. Dingwall & B. Hoselitz trans. 1981).
60. According to a thoroughly subjectivist theory of economic value, such a crite-
rion is impossible to develop. See, e.g., L. von Mises, Human Action 94-98, 242, 35,4
(rev. ed. 1963) (discussing the impossibility of measuring exchange value because of the
subjectivity of value); see alsoJ. Buchanan, supra note 47, at 23-26 (briefly tracing the
history of "the subjectivist economics of the latter-day Austrians, notably Mises and
Hayek").
61. On the evolution of the "conscience" conception of equitable relief, see John-
son, Unconscionability and the Federal Chancellors: A Survey of U.C.C. Section 2-302
Interpretations in the Federal Circuits During the 1980's, 16 Lincoln L. Rev. 21, 56
nn.341-42 (1985).
62. See Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 754 ("This new paradigm does not replace the
bargain principle, which is based on sound sense and continues to govern the normal
case."); see also Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 Harv. L.
Rev. 1717, 1748 (1982) ("Surely all transactions made in organized markets at competi-
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come process based-looking for either information asymmetries or
what is called "unequal bargaining power." 63
The first of these responses attempts to find extreme instances of
violations of a standard that cannot be articulated-or at least cannot
be articulated for most transactions, 64 while the latter represents a re-
treat from the substantive fairness position altogether. Therefore, at
best a substantive fairness approach attempts to deal with a qualitative
issue by making either a quantitative or a procedural assessment, but
what is being measured-the nature of the unfaimess-is not
disclosed. 65
Most importantly for this discussion, however, the substantive fair-
ness approach fails to address squarely the most central and common
problem of contract theory: which conscionable agreements should be
enforced and which should not? This after all, is, or ought to be, the
starting point of a useful theory of contractual obligation that purports
to discern which commitments merit legal enforcement. 66 In sum, the
substantive fairness approach provides neither meaningful standards
nor predictable results. Both the extreme indeterminacy and the focus
on aberrant cases inherent in a principle of substantive fairness prevent
it from providing the overarching account of contractual obligation that
contract theory requires.
3. The Problem With Standards-Based Theories. - All standards-based
theories face two problems, one that is obvious and another that is
more subtle. The obvious problem, which has already been discussed,
is identifying and defending the appropriate standard by which en-
forceable commitments can be distinguished from those that should be
unenforceable. The more subtle problem arises from the fact that stan-
tive prices must go unquestioned, for to hold one of these exchanges suspect would be
to strike down all identical transactions."). Even a severe critic of freedom of contract
agrees that this is an aspect of current unconscionability doctrine. See Kennedy, Distrib-
utive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Com-
pulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 621 (1982).
63. See E. Farnsworth, supra note 13, § 4.28, at 314-16.
64. Professor Eisenberg, for example, confines his analysis to the identification of
circumstances or "norms" that, if present, would call the fairness of the resulting agree-
ment into question. He discusses exploitation of distress, transactional incapacity, sus-
ceptibility to unfair persuasion, and price-ignorance. See Eisenberg, supra note 16, at
754-85. Eisenberg's resort to suspect circumstances finesses the issue of discerning the
quality of "unfairness" of the substantive bargain that he is seeking to police. In a con-
sent theory, the circumstances he lists would be analyzed as (controversial) contenders
for defenses that undermine the normal moral significance of consent. See infra notes
210-14 and accompanying text.
65. See Epstein, supra note 54, at 306 ("It is difficult to know what principles iden-
tify the 'just term,' and for the same reasons that make it so difficult to determine the
'just price.' "); see also L. von Mises, supra note 60, at 727-30 (discussing the nature
and deficiencies of "just price" theories).
66. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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dards-based contract theories are types of what Robert Nozick has
called "patterned" principles of distributive justice:
[A] principle of distribution [is] patterned if it specifies that a
distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension,
weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic order-
ing of natural dimensions ....
Almost every suggested principle of distributive justice is
patterned: to each according to his moral merit, or needs, or
marginal product, or how hard he tries, or the weighted sum
of the foregoing, and so on.6 7
The problem created by such patterned theories ofjustice-includ-
ing theories based on some notion of efficiency-is that they require
constant interferences with individual preferences. "Render posses-
sions ever so equal, man's different degrees of art, care, and industry
will immediately break that equality."'68 The maintenance of a pattern,
therefore, requires either that persons be stopped from entering the
contracts they desire, or that those in power "continually (or periodi-
cally) interfere to take from some persons resources that others for
some reason chose to transfer to them."'69
Such interferences are at least presumptively suspect. They may
sometimes even be objectionable according to the particular standard
that is being used to justify the intervention. For example, inefficiency
might be shown to be the ultimate result of interventions to achieve
"efficiency" that thwart individual preferences in this way. 70 And a sys-
tem in which judges may-in the absence of fraud, duress, or some
other demonstrable defect in the formation process-second-guess the
wisdom of the parties may create more substantive unfairness than it
cures. 7 1 More fundamentally, a theory of rights might support the con-
clusion that such interferences are unjust and wrong.72
67. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 156-57 (1974).
68. D. Hume, supra note 10, at 25.
69. R. Nozick, supra note 67, at 163. See generally his discussion of "how liberty
upsets patterns." Id. at 160-64.
70. SeeJ. Gray, Indirect Utility and Fundamental Rights, Soc. Phil. & Pol'y, Spring
1984, at 73, 85 ("If direct utilitarian policy is counterproductive, we must accept practi-
cal constraints on it, and there is nothing to say that these will not include the distribu-
tive contraints imposed by principles conferring weighty moral rights on individuals.");
see also Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 Ethics 315 (1985) (further elabo-
rating this position).
71. Cf. Epstein, supra note 54, at 315 ("[W]hen the doctrine of unconscionability is
used in its substantive dimension, . . . it serves only to undercut the private right of
contract in a manner that is apt to do more social harm than good.").
72. See, e.g., R. Nozick, supra note 67, at 168 ("From the point of view of an enti-
tlement theory, redistribution is a serious matter indeed, involving, as it does, the viola-
tion of people's rights."); Mack, In Defense of Unbridled Freedom of Contract, 40 Am.
J. Econ. & Soc. 1 (1981) (each person should have liberty to enter into and right to insist





Process-based theories shift the focus of the inquiry from the con-
tract parties and from the substance of the parties' agreement to the
manner in which the parties reached their agreement. Such theories
posit appropriate procedures for establishing enforceable obligations
and then assess any given transaction to see if these procedures were
followed. The best known theory of this sort is the bargain theory of
consideration.
1. The Bargain Theory of Consideration. - The origin of the modern
doctrine of consideration can be traced to the rise of the action of as-
sumpsit.7 3 When the voluntary assumption of obligation came to be
viewed as the basis of contractual enforcement, no one seriously sug-
gested that every demonstrable agreement could or should be legally
enforced. The number of agreements made every day are so numerous
that for reasons of both practice and principle some distinction, apart
from that made by purely evidentiary requirements, 74 must be made
between enforceable and unenforceable agreements.
The doctrine of consideration was devised to provide this distinc-
tion. 75 Where consideration is present, an agreement ordinarily will be
enforced. And, most significantly, where there is no consideration,
even if the commitment is clear and unambiguous, enforcement is sup-
posed to be unavailable. In the nineteenth century, the "bargain theory
of consideration" was promoted by some-most notably Holmes and
Langdell-as a way of answering the problem of which commitments
merit legal protection. Today it is probably the predominant theory of
consideration and is embodied in section 71 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts:
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return
promise must be bargained for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is
sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is
given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.76
This approach attempts to discern "mutuality" of inducement from the
motives and acts of both parties to the transaction. It is not what is
bargained for that is important; what solely matters is that each per-
son's promise or performance is induced by the other's.
73. See E. Farnsworth, supra note 13, § 1.6, at 19-20.
74. These are rules that enable courts and other strangers to the transaction to
evaluate the legitimacy of contracting parties' often conflicting claims, for example, a
statute of frauds or a rule regulating the use of parol evidence. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-
201, 2-202 (1977).
75. See A. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract 316 (1975); see
also Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 640 (answer to the question of what kinds of promises
should be enforced "traditionally has been subsumed under the heading
.consideration' 
").
76. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71(1), (2) (1979).
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The difficulties presented by the doctrine of consideration depend
on which way the concept is viewed. If the doctrine is interpreted re-
strictively, then whole classes of "serious" agreements will be thought
to be lacking consideration. In his recent discussion of consideration,
Charles Fried lists four kinds of cases-promises to keep an offer open,
to release a debt, to modify an obligation, and to pay for past favors-
where promisees have traditionally had considerable difficulty ob-
taining legal relief for nonperformance because bargained-for consid-
eration is lacking,7 7 although it is generally conceded that the parties
may have intended to be legally bound and that enforcement should
therefore be available. 78 To these may be added unbargained-for
promises to assume the obligations of another,79 to convey land, to
give to charities, and those made by bailees and within the family.8 0
In each of these types of cases, a promise is made and then broken.
The promisee then seeks to base his cause of action on the promise. In
many of these cases, the promise is a serious and unambiguous one. In
each situation, however, there is no "bargain" and therefore no consid-
eration for the promise.
Such cases as these invite attempts by judges and others to expand
the concept of consideration beyond the bargain requirement.81 Any
such attempt to capture these and other types of cases will, however,
run afoul of an opposing difficulty. If the web of consideration doctrine
is woven too loosely, it will increasingly capture "social" agreements
where legal enforcement is not contemplated-for example, promises
of financial assistance between family members.8 2 Thus, any expanded
concept of consideration threatens to undermine the doctrine's tradi-
77. See C. Fried, supra note 8, at 28.
78. That enforcement is deemed desirable in such cases is evidenced by statutes
that have sometimes been enacted to provide a basis for liability. See id.; see, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 2-205 & comment 2 (1977) (Firm offer made binding in order "to give effect to
the deliberate intention of a merchant .... ").
79. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-408 & comment 2 (1977).
80. E. Farnsworth, supra note 13, § 2.19, at 90-91.
81. A well-known example of where the bargain requirement was stretched to the
breaking point is, Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y.
369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927) (holding that college's promise to set up a memorial fund was
consideration for a promise to make a "gift" to the college). E. Farnsworth, supra note
13, § 2.19, at 91, characterizes the consideration analysis in this case as "tenuous." Be-
cause of the presence of formalities and the recital of "moral" consideration, a consent
theory might have reached the same result. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying
text. Then again, certain terms of the pledge at issue may indicate an intent that it be
revokable. See Allegheny College, 246 N.Y. at 372, 159 N.E. at 174 ("This pledge shall be
valid only on the condition that the provisions of my Will, now extant, shall be first
met."). Such difficulties of interpretation are to be expected in a legal regime that so
uncertainly enforces unbargained-for, but formal, promises, since the parties cannot be
sure of the form that will effectuate their purpose. See infra notes 166-81 and accompa-
nying text.
82. See, e.g., Richards v. Richards, 46 Pa. 78, 82 (1863) (enforcing such assurances
would be "exceedingly hurtful to the freedom of social intercourse").
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tional function: distinguishing enforceable from unenforceable agree-
ments in a predictable fashion to allow for private planning and to
prevent the weight of legal coercion from falling upon those informal
or "social" arrangements where the parties have not contemplated
legal sanctions for breach.8 3
Each strategy to deal with the problems generated by a doctrine of
consideration, therefore, wreaks havoc in its own way with a coherent
theory of contractual obligation. With a restrictive definition like that
of bargain, serious promises which merit enforcement are left unen-
forced. With an expansive formulation, informal promises that are
thought to be properly outside the province of legal coercion will be
made the subject of legal sanctions. The most recognized problem with
the bargain theory is that it appears to have erred too far in the direc-
tion of under-enforcement.8 4 However, the bargain theory suffers in a
more fundamental way from its purely process-based character.
2. The Problem With Process-Based Theories. - The problem with pro-
cess-based theories is not simply that they must strike a balance be-
tween over- and under-enforcement. Such trade-offs cannot be
completely avoided in any system that bases decision-making on rules
and principles of general application.8 5 The real problem with process-
based theories like the bargain theory of consideration is that they
place insurmountable obstacles in the way of minimizing such difficul-
ties of enforcement.
First, a process-based theory's exclusive focus on the process that
justifies contractual enforcement conceals the substantive values that
must support any choice of process. By obscuring these values, pro-
cess-based theories come to treat their favored procedural devices as
ends, rather than as means. Then, when the adopted procedures inevi-
tably give rise to problems of fit between means and ends, a process-
based theory that is divorced from ends cannot say why this has oc-
curred or what is to be done about it. This inherent weakness of pro-
cess-based theories has plagued the bargain theory of consideration.8 6
83. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 573 ("Certainly, some freedom to change one's
mind is necessary for free intercourse between those who lack omniscience."); Fuller,
Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 813 (1941) ("There is a real need for a
field of human intercourse freed from legal restraints, for a field where men may without
liability withdraw assurances they have once given." (citation omitted)).
84. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 642.
85. See, e.g., Aristotle, supra note 56, at 141 ("[A]I1 law is universal, but there are
some things about which it is not possible to speak correctly in universal terms.");
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 125 (1961) ("[U]ncertainty at the borderline is the
price to be paid for the use of general classifying terms in any form of communication
concerning matters of fact."). It is possible, however, that a presumptive approach to
legal rulemaking minimizes this type of error. See infra notes 162-64 and accompany-
ing text.
86. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 642 ("[S]uch an approach ... tends to stifle
judicial creativity and reconceptualization.").
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The bargain theory, which was devised to limit the applicability of
assumpsit,8 7 fails to ensure the enforcement of certain reasonably well-
defined categories of unbargained-for, but "serious" commitments.88
Then, when courts are moved to enforce such commitments, the princi-
pal theory of consideration to which they adhere cannot account for
these "exceptions" to the normal requirement of a bargain without ap-
pealing to concepts more fundamental than bargaining. Ironically, the
rise of assumpsit-the source of the need for the consideration doc-
trine-was itself due to the inability of the then existing process-based
writ system to accommodate enforcement of informal, but serious
promises.8 9
Second, an exclusively process-based theory cannot itself explain
why certain kinds of commitments are not and should not be enforcea-
ble. For example, it is widely recognized that agreements to perform
illegal acts should not be enforceable. Similarly, slavery contracts are
also thought to be unenforceable per se. If, however, agreements of
these types were reached in conformity with all "rules of the game," a
theory that looks only to the rules of the game to decide issues of en-
forceability cannot say why such an otherwise "proper" agreement
should be unenforceable.
These two types of problems, however, are not confined to pro-
cess-based theories. As was seen above,9 0 party-based theories based
on will and reliance are also plagued by an inability to account for and
explain certain "exceptional" agreements that are enforceable without
recourse to their animating principles. And theories based on princi-
ples of will, reliance, or efficiency have as hard a time as process-based
theories explaining why certain agreements are unenforceable due to
so-called "public policy" exceptions to their respective norms of con-
tractual obligation.
Notwithstanding the weaknesses inherent in process-based theo-
ries, such theories offer significant advantages over both party-based
and standards-based theories. By employing a neutral criterion for de-
termining contractual enforcement, a process-based theory can better
protect both the contractual intent and the reliance of both parties than
one-sided party-based theories, provided it identifies features of the
contractual process that normally correspond to the presence of con-
tractual intent and substantial reliance. By identifying judicially worka-
ble criteria of enforcement, process-based theories can avoid the
difficulties of extreme indeterminacy that were seen to plague stan-
dards-based theories.9 1 They can, in short, better provide the tradi-
87. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
89. See A. Simpson, supra note 75, at 136-96 (discussing difficulties in enforcing
informal contracts prior to the development of assumpsit).
90. See supra notes 9-16, 19-25 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 31-45, 54-66 and accompanying text.
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tionally acknowledged advantages of a system of generally applicable
laws, such as facilitating private planning and helping to ensure equal
treatment of similarly situated persons. Perhaps it is these advantages
that have permitted a process-based theory like the bargain theory to
survive its frequent detractors.
The significant administrative advantages of process-based theo-
ries suggest that the best approach to contractual obligation is one that
preserves a procedural aspect of contract law, while recognizing that
such procedures are dependent for their ultimate justification on more
fundamental, substantive principles of right that occasionally affect pro-
cedural analysis in two ways. First, these principles might suggest spe-
cific improvements in procedures governing contract formation that are
appropriate in the event that previously adopted procedures have cre-
ated well-defined problems of under-enforcement. Second, these prin-
ciples might serve to deprive certain procedurally immaculate
agreements of their normal moral significance, thereby ameliorating
identifiable problems of over-enforcement. 92 A consent theory of con-
tract is such an approach.
II. A CONSENT THEORY OF CONTRACT
A. Entitlement Theory and Contract: The Central Importance of Consent
1. Entitlements as the Root of Contractual Obligation. - The function of
an entitlements theory based on individual rights is to define the
boundaries within which individuals may live, act, and pursue happi-
ness free of the forcible interference of others.93 A theory of entitle-
ments specifies the rights that individuals possess or may possess; it
tells us what may be owned and who owns it; it circumscribes the indi-
vidual boundaries of human freedom.94 Any coherent theory ofjustice
based on individual rights must therefore contain principles that de-
scribe how such rights are initially acquired, how they are transferred
from person to person, what the substance and limits of properly ob-
tained rights are, and how interferences with these entitlements are to
92. The relationship between procedural strictures and underlying principles is
analogous to Ronald Dworkin's distinction between rules and principles, see R. Dwor-
kin, Taking Rights Seriously 22-39 (1977), in that process rules of contract would be
enforceable because of more fundamental principles and that such principles would also
serve to define the outer limits of the rules.
93. The literature on entitlements or rights is vital and growing. I describe some of
the factors that led to this growth in Barnett, supra note 3, at 1225-33. For a useful
bibliography, see Nickel, Bibliographical Update/The Nature and Foundations of
Rights, Grim. Just. Ethics, Summer/Fall 1982, at 64 (also citing other bibliographies).
For a survey of the economic analysis of property rights, see Furubotn & Pejovich, supra
note 33.
94. See Furubotn & Pejovich, supra note 33, at 1139 ("The prevailing system of
property rights in the community can be described ... as the set of economic and social





These constituent parts of an entitlements theory comport sub-
stantially with the traditional categories of private law. The issue of
initial acquisition of entitlements in real and chattel resources is dealt
with primarily in property law; tort law concerns the protection of and
proper limits on resource use; and contract law deals with transfers of
rights between rights holders.9 6 Each category contains principles of
rectification for the breach of legal obligations. 97
Viewing contract law as part of a more general theory of individual
entitlements that specifies how resources may be rightly acquired
(property law), used (tort law), and transferred (contract law) is not
new.98 And, of course, the actual historical development of these legal
categories has not perfectly conformed to the conceptual distinctions
that an entitlements approach suggests. But this approach has long
been neglected as a way of resolving some of the thorniest issues of
contract theory and doctrine.
According to an entitlements approach, rights may be uncondi-
tionally granted to another (a gift), or their transfer may be conditioned
upon some act or reciprocal transfer by the transferee (an exchange).
Contract law concerns ways in which rights are transferred or alienated.
Accordingly, the enforceability of all agreements is limited by what
rights are capable of being transferred from one person to another.
Whether a purported right is genuine or can be legitimately transferred
is not an issue of contract theory only, but is one that may also require
reference to the underlying theory of entitlements-that is, the area of
legal theory that specifies what rights individuals have and the manner
by which they come to have them. In this respect, the explanation of
the binding nature of contractual commitments is derived from more
fundamental notions of entitlements and how they are acquired and
transferred.
95. Cf. R. Nozick, supra note 67, at 150-53 (providing a tripartite definition ofjus-
tice consisting ofjustice in acquisition, transfer, and rectification).
96. See Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9J. Legal Stud. 253,
255 (1980).
97. Another possible category is restitution, which specifies circumstances not cov-
ered by either contract or tort when compensation for nongratuitous transfers of re-
sources might be available. See Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through
the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 504
(1980).
98. Several commentators have recently referred to its historical antecedents. A.
Simpson, supra note 75, provides the most rigorous examination of the history of this
approach and its operation and demise. See also P. Atiyah, supra note 16, at 89 ("In
Blackstone's Commentaries,. . . contract and succession are both dealt with as a means by
which the title to property gets transferred."); M. Horwitz, The Transformation of
American Law 1780-1860, at 162 (1977) ("As a result of the subordination of contract
to property, eighteenth century jurists endorsed a title theory of contractual exchange




The subjects of most rights transfer agreements are entitlements
that are indisputably alienable. In such cases the rules of contract law
are entirely sufficient to explain and justify a judicial decision. How-
ever, in rare cases-such as agreements amounting to slavery arrange-
ments or requiring the violation of another's rights-contract law's
dependency on rights theory will be of crucial importance in identifying
appropriate concerns about the substance of voluntary agreements.
For example, agreements to transfer inalienable rights99-rights that
for some reason cannot be transferred-or to transfer rights that for
some reason cannot be obtained, would not, without more, be valid and
enforceable contracts.100
Although existing theories of contractual obligation have failed to
recognize this dependent relationship explicitly, such a notion may
sometimes be implicit. For example, it is difficult to understand how
any theory based on the "will" of the individual or the rectification of
"harm" to an individual caused by reliance makes sense without assum-
ing a background of more basic individual rights. One would not care
at all about an individual's expressed "will" or any reliance injury she
might have sustained unless that person has a pre-contractual right to
"bind herself" or a right to be protected from certain kinds of harm.
Efficiency-based theories also depend on a (usually assumed) set of en-
titlements that form the basis of subsequent "efficient" exchanges.' 0 1
The many gaps in these articulated theories of contract are, in practice,
most probably filled by our shared intuitions about fundamental indi-
vidual rights. Making this conceptual relationship explicit helps to clar-
ify what continues to be a hazy understanding of contractual obligation.
As Part I demonstrated, a proper understanding of contractual ob-
ligation and its limits requires an appeal to something more fundamen-
tal than the concepts of will, reliance, efficiency, fairness, or bargain. A
99. Elaborating the important distinction between alienable and inalienable rights
would require a more general discussion of rights theory than is possible here. See
Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, Soc. Phil. & Pol'y, Autumn 1986
(forthcoming); see also Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale L.J.
763 (1983) (discussing implications for contract theory of the distinction between aliena-
ble and inalienable rights). A number of recent treatments of the issue of inalienable
rights reinforce its significance for legal and moral theory. SeeJ. Feinberg, Rights, Jus-
tice, and the Bounds of Liberty 238-46 (1980); D. Meyer, Inalienable Rights: A Defense
(1985); H. Veatch, Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? ch. 3 (1986); Epstein, Why Restrain
Alienation?, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 970 (1985); Kuflik, The Inalienability of Autonomy, 13
Phil. & Pub. Affs. 271 (1984); McConnell, The Nature and Basis of Inalienable Rights, 3
Law & Phil. 25 (1984); Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property
Rights, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 931 (1985).
100. Other bases of obligation are possible besides contractual obligation, how-
ever, such as those recognized under the law of tort and restitution.
101. See Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347,
347 (1967) ("Economists usually take the bundle of property rights as a datum and ask
for an explanation of the forces determining the price and the number of units of a good
to which these rights attach.").
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framework or theory is needed to order these fundamental concerns, to
show where each "principle" stands in relation to others. Recognizing
the necessity of such an inquiry places the contract theorist in the realm
of entitlements or rights theory. The legitimacy of principles of con-
tract that determine which transfers of rights are valid depends upon
the nature of individual entitlements and the extent to which rights
have been or will be acquired by the parties to a transfer. The process
of contractual transfer cannot be completely comprehended, therefore,
without considering more fundamental issues, namely the nature and
sources of individual entitlements and the means by which they come to
be acquired.
2. The Allocative and Distributional Function of Individual Rights. - Any
concept of individual rights must assume a social context. If the world
were inhabited by one person, it might make sense to speak of that
person's actions as "good" or "bad." Such a moral judgment might,
for example, look to whether or not that person had chosen to live what
might be called the "good life." 10 2 It makes no sense, however, to
speak about this person's rights. As one court noted: "Unless and un-
til one is brought into relation with other men, or property, or rights,
he has no obligation to act with reference to them; and this is true
whether the obligation be called legal, moral, or reasonable." 10 3
From the moment individuals live in close enough proximity to
one another to compete for the use of scarce natural resources, some
way of allocating those resources must be found. In short, some
scheme of specifying how individuals may acquire, use, and transfer re-
sources must be recognized. Certain facts of human existence make
certain principles of allocation ineluctable. For example, it is a funda-
mental human requirement that individuals acquire and consume natu-
ral resources, even though such activity is often inconsistent with a
similar use of the same resources by others.
"Property rights" is the term traditionally used to describe an indi-
vidual's entitlements to use and consume resources-both the individ-
ual's person and her external possessions-free from the physical
interference of others.10 4 That possession and use of resources is by
102. See, e.g., H. Veatch, For an Ontology of Morals (1971) (a critique of contem-
porary ethical theory from an Aristotelian perspective).
103. Garland v. Boston & M.R.R., 76 N.H. 556, 557, 86 A. 141, 142 (1913). As the
court colorfully put the point in its discussion of duties of care: "The rule of reasonable
care, under the circumstances, could not limit the conduct of Robinson Crusoe as he was
at first situated; but as soon as he saw the tracks in the sand the rule began to have
vitality." Id. at 563, 86 A. at 141; see also Demsetz, supra note 101, at 347 ("In the
world of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role.").
104. See, e.g., Furubotn & Pejovich, supra note 33, at 1139 ("[P]roperty rights do
not refer to relations between men and things but, rather, to the sanctioned behavioral rela-
tions among men that arise from the existence of things and pertain to their use." (emphasis in
original)). Today, the term "property rights" tends to be limited only to rights to exter-
nal resources. Traditionally, however, it was accorded the meaning employed in the
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"right" suggests that any attempt at physical interference with posses-
sion and use may be resisted by force if necessary.' 0 5 Additionally, if
another interferes with a rightful distribution of resources, this viola-
tion may be rectified by redistributing resources.' 0 6 Some rights to
property can be exclusive and others less so. The exact contours of a
proper theory of rights need not be specified here. 10 7 Only the recog-
nition that some allocation of rights to resource possession and use is an
unavoidable prerequisite of human survival and of human fulfillment is
relevant to this discussion.
Although entitlements to resources can be acquired directly from
nature by individual labor, in a complex society they will more likely be
acquired from others.' 08 Contract law, according to an entitlements
approach, is thus a body of general principles and more specific rules
the function of which is to identify the rights of individuals engaged in
transferring entitlements, and thereby indicate when physical or legal
force may legitimately be used to preserve those rights and to rectify
any unjust interference with the transfer process.
text-the moral and legal jurisdiction a person has both over her body and over external
resources. See, e.g., J. Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End
of Civil Government, in Two Treatises of Civil Government ch. V, § 27 (1690) ("every
man has a 'property' in his own 'person' "). This conception of property was so well
accepted that some radical abolitionists in the 19th century referred to slavery as the
crime of "manstealing." See, e.g., S. Foster, The Brotherhood of Thieves, or a True
Picture of the American Church and Clergy 10 (1843), quoted in The Antislavery Argu-
ment 138 (W. &J. Pease eds. 1965). This broader view of property rights also prevailed
in the Middle Ages. See McGovern, Private Property and Individual Rights in the Com-
mentaries of theJurists, A.D. 1200-1550, in Essays in Memory of Schafer Williams (ten-
tative title) (S. Bowman & B. Cody eds.) (forthcoming).
105. See, e.g., R. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 499 (1981) ("[A] right is
something for which one can demand or enforce compliance."); Furubotn & Pejovich,
supra note 33, at 1139 ("Property rights assignments specify the norms of behavior with
respect to things that each and every person must observe in his interactions with other
persons, or bear the cost for nonobservance.").
106. See, e.g., Nickel, Justice in Compensation, 18 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 379,
381-82 (1976) ("[Clompensation protects just distributions, and the rights they involve,
by undoing, insofar as possible, actions that disturb such distributions.").
107. I have more fully discussed this issue elsewhere. See Barnett, The Justice of
Restitution, 25 Am.J.Juris. 117 (1980) (defending the justice of restitutive rectification);
Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: Part One-Power vs. Liberty, Crim. Just.
Ethics, Summer/Fall, 1985, at 50 (discussing the sources and proper content of a prop-
erty rights theory) [hereinafter cited as Pursuing Justice]; Barnett, Restitution: A New
Paradigm of Criminal Justice, 87 Ethics 279 (1977) (discussing the merits of various
approaches to rectification); Barnett, supra note 21, at 6-15 (discussing the classical
liberal account of law and rights); Barnett, Public Decisions and Private Rights (Book
Review), Crim.Just. Ethics, Summer/Fall, 1984, at 50 (discussing the methodology of a
property rights approach).
108. Cf. Baird & Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property,
13J. Legal Stud. 299, 299 (1984) ("Few of us who own property actually have reduced it
to private property from a state of nature (or ownership in common). No matter what
theory justifies initial ownership rights, our enjoyment of most property rests on our
ability to acquire it from someone else.").
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3. Consent as the Moral Component of a Contractual Transaction. - The
areas of moral obligations and legal obligations are not coextensive. 10 9
A moral obligation is something we ought to do or refrain from doing.
A moral obligation that is not also a valid legal obligation can only be
legitimately secured by voluntary means. That is, one may have a moral
obligation to do something, but unless there is also a valid legal obliga-
tion, one cannot legitimately be forced by another to do it. A moral
obligation is only a legal obligation if it can be enforced by the use or
threat of legal force.10 This added dimension of force requires moral
justification. The principal task of legal theory, then, is to identify cir-
cumstances when legal enforcement is morally justified. I I '
Entitlements theories seek to perform this task by using moral
analysis to derive individual legal rights, that is, claims that may bejus-
tifiably enforced. 1 2 A theory of contractual obligation is the part of an
entitlements theory that focuses on liability arising from the wrongful
interference with a valid rights transfer. Until such an interference is
corrected-by force if necessary-the distribution of resources caused
by the interference is unjust. Justice consists of correcting this situation
to bring resource distribution into conformity with entitlements." 1
109. See L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 1-2 (rev. ed. 1969); R. Nozick, supra note
105, at 503 ("Political philosophy ... is mainly the theory of what behavior legitimately
may be enforced, and of the nature of the institutional structure that stays within and
supports these enforceable rights .... In no way does political philosophy or the
realm of the state exhaust the realm of the morally desireable or moral oughts.").
110. On the role that coercion ought to play in jurisprudential thought, see Nance,
Legal Theory and the Pivotal Role of the Concept of Coercion, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. I
(1985).
111. One can distinguish between a positive legal obligation, which a particular legal
system will enforce (whether or not it should), and a valid legal obligation, which is an
obligation that it is morally appropriate to enforce. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1958); Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1958). For an
excellent discussion of this distinction, seeJ. Murphy &J. Coleman, The Philosophy of
Law: An Introduction toJurisprudence 7-68 (1984). In this section, the latter meaning
is the one used.
112. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
113. In certain rare circumstances, however, the protection of holdings might ar-
gue against such redistribution. The doctrine of adverse possession, for example, sug-
gests that thejustice of some present holdings of resources that did not originate by just
means might nonetheless be considered rightful due to the passage of time. See
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 135, 136 (1918). Similarly,
once so much time has passed since the initial "taking" that both the original wrongdoer
and the original owner (or her discernible heirs) are no longer alive to claim ownership,
then an innocent person in possession might be acknowledged as holding good title, Cf.
Sher, Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights, 10 Phil. & Pub. Affs. 3 (1980) (discussing the
problems of rectifying past injustices). In the absence of an identifiable victim, the inno-
cent recipient of property that was originally wrongfully acquired would, as against the
world, have the best claim to title-or so the argument goes. Falling as it would within
the realm of property law and outside the boundaries of contract law, a critical analysis
of such an argument is beyond the scope of this Article.
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To identify the moral component that distinguishes valid from in-
valid rights transfers, it is first necessary to separate moral principles
governing the rightful acquisition and use of resources from those gov-
erning their transfer. Rights are the means by which freedom of action
and interaction are facilitated and regulated in society,' 1 4 and thus the
rights we have to acquire previously unowned resources and to use that
which we acquire must not be subject to the expressed assent of others.
Although societal acquiescence may be a practical necessity for rights
to be legally respected, no individual or group need consent to our
appropriation of previously unowned resources or their use for our
rights to morally vest. 1 15
Similarly, principles governing rights transfer should be distin-
guished from principles governing resource use. Tort law concerns ob-
ligations arising from interferences with others' rights. A tortfeasor
who interferes with another's rights (rather than obtaining a valid trans-
fer of those rights to herself) is liable because of that interference, not
because she consented to be held liable for her actions that impair an-
other's rights. A tortfeasor can be said to "forfeit" (as opposed to
alienate or transfer) rights to resources in order to provide compensa-
tion to the victim of the tort.1 16
In contrast, contract law concerns enforceable obligations arising
from the valid transfer of entitlements that are already vested in someone,
and this difference is what makes consent a moral prerequisite to con-
tractual obligation. The rules governing alienation of property rights
by transfer perform the same function as rules governing their acquisi-
tion and those specifying their proper content: facilitating freedom of
human action and interaction.1 17 Freedom of action and interaction
would be seriously impeded, and possibly destroyed, if legitimate rights
holders who have not acted in a tortious manner could be deprived of
114. See Barnett, Pursuing Justice, supra note 107, at 56-63.
115. The fact that society does not recognize a right cannot alone mean that mor-
ally such a right does not exist. Cf. R. Dworkin, supra note 92, at 184-85 (1977):
In practice the Government will have the last word on what an individual's
rights are, because its police will do what its officials and courts say. But that
does not mean that the Government's view is necessarily the correct view; any-
one who thinks it does must believe that men and women have only such moral
rights as Government chooses to grant, which means that they have no moral
rights at all.
Requiring societal acquiescence for the moral vesting of initially acquired rights would
amount to a "consent theory" of property acquisition. See Rose, Possession as the Ori-
gin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73, 74 (1985) ("According to this theory, the original
owner got title through the consent of the rest of humanity .... ").
116. See J. Feinberg, supra note 99, at 239-40 (distinguishing between alienating
and forfeiting rights); Kuflik, supra note 99, at 275 ("To say that autonomy cannot be
alienated is not to imply that in special circumstances it cannot be forfeited. A person
may lose through misconduct what it would be wrong for him to transfer or relinquish
through consent or agreement.").
117. See Barnett, Pursuing Justice, supra note 107, at 56-63.
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their rights by force of law without their consent."i t  Moreover, the
moral requirement of consent mandates that others take the interests of
the rights holder into account when seeking to obtain the rights she
possesses. 91 Wallace Matson succinctly describes the view of justice
that makes consent the moral component of contractual transfer:
(justice is] . . . rendering every man his due. A man's due is
what he has acquired by his own efforts and not taken from
some other man without consent. A community in which this
conception is realized will be one in which the members agree
not to interfere in the legitimate endeavors of each other to
achieve their individual goals, and to help each other to the
extent that the conditions for doing so are mutually satisfac-
tory . . . . Such a community will be one giving the freest
possible rein to all its members to develop their particular ca-
pacities and use them to carry out their plans for their own
betterment . . . . [T]his activity is The Good for Man
120
118. See Baird &Jackson, supra note 108, at 299-300 ("Legal rules must confront
the problems associated with the transfer of property from one individual to another.
When we already own property, we want to ensure that we can control its disposition-
that a new "owner" will not come into existence without our consent." (emphasis added)).
119. Cf. Demsetz, supra note 44, at 64 ("A property right system which requires the
prior agreement of these input owners before they can be put to a particular task insures
that these costs will be taken into account [by others]."). Moreover, asJoel Feinberg has
noted:
To have a right typically is to have the discretion or "liberty" to exercise it or
not as one chooses. This freedom is another feature of right-ownership that
helps to explain why rights are so valuable. When a person has a discretionary
right and fully understands the power that possession gives him, he can if he
chooses make sacrifices for the sake of others, voluntarily give up what is right-
fully his own, freely make gifts that he is in no way obligated to make, and
forgive others for their wrongs to him by declining to demand the compensa-
tion or vengeance he may have coming or by warmly welcoming them back into
his friendship or love .... Without the duties that others have toward one
(correlated with one's rights against them) there could be no sense in the no-
tion of one's superrogatory conduct towards other people, for to help others
when one has the right to decline is precisely what conduct "above and beyond
duty" amounts to.
J. Feinberg, supra note 99, at 156-57.
120. Matson, Justice: A Funeral Oration, Soc. Phil. & Pol'y, Autumn 1983, at 94,
111-12 (1983) (emphasis added). He then contrasts this "bottom up" conception of
justice with another:
The other conception holds justice to be the satisfaction of needs so as to bring
everyone as far as possible onto the same plateau of pleasurable experience.
The view of human life underlying it is that life consists of two separable
phases, production and consumption; the consumption phase is where The
Good lies; there is ultimately no reason why any individual should have any
more or less of this Good than any other individual; and the problem of how to
secure the requisite production is merely technical. Society based on this con-
ception must be structured as a hierarchy of authority, in order to solve the
problem of production and to administer justice, i.e. to adjust the satisfaction
quanta. Thus I have called this justice from the top down. . ..
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Consequently, the consent of the rights holder to be legally obli-
gated 12t is the moral component that distinguishes valid from invalid
transfers of alienable rights in a system of entitlements. 22 It is not
altogether novel to suggest that consent is at the heart of contract
law,' 23 although the claim that contractual obligation arises from a con-
sent to a transfer of entitlements and is thereby dependent on a theory
of entitlements is not widely acknowledged. 124 Yet it is certainly a com-
Id. at 112. For an example of the "top down" conception ofjustice applied to contract
law, see Kronman, infra note 124.
121. Unlike "will" or "intent," the word "consent" can be used either subjectively
to describe a state of mind or objectively to describe an interrelational act. Webster's
New World Dictionary of the American language (1970) offers in part this definition:
consent, vi. 1.a) to agree (to do something) b) give permission, approval,
or assent (to something proposed or requested) 2. [Obs.] to agree in opinion-
n. 1. permission, approval; or assent 2. agreement in opinion or sentiment
[by common consent]
Id. at 302. Note that the first meaning for both the verb and the noun concerns an
objective act, while the second meaning concerns a state of mind. The name "consent
theory of contract" plays upon the objective-subjective ambiguity of "consent." While
the focus of a consent theory may sometimes shift from objective to subjective consent,
see infra notes 154-61 and accompanying text, the title is still apt, since even when
operating at the objective level, the theory is concerned with the manifestation of consent
and not a manifestation of some other intention. For clarity, "assent" will be used here
to mean a subjective intent to be legally bound, and "consent" will generally be used to
mean an objectively manifested intent to be legally bound, see infra notes 133-53 and
accompanying text.
122. See Demsetz, supra note 44, at 62 ("A private property right system requires
the prior consent of 'owners' before their property can be affected by others.").
123. See P. Atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law 177 (1981) ("[P]romising may be
reducible to a species of consent, for consent is a broader and perhaps more basic
source of obligation."); Green, Is an Offer Always a Promise?, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 95, 95
(1928) ("(W]hen we are sophisticated enough to have ideas of ownership, societal or
legal, ideas of right, as distinguished from ideas about situations of fact, an offer to sell
may simply be an expression of consent or volition that ownership shall pass if and when
the offer is accepted ....").
If promising is but a special instance of consent, it may well be that the traditional
conception of contracts as exclusively concerning the matter of enforceable promises is
what has blinded the profession to the more fundamental theoretical role of consent.
For an example of the typical modern insistence on the promisory nature of contracts,
see E. Farnsworth, supra note 13:
The second limitation suggested by this definition is that the law of contracts is
confined to promises. It is therefore concerned with exchanges that relate to the
future because a "promise" is a commitment by a person as to his future behav-
ior. Examples of exchanges that do not include such a commitment (and so do
not involve a contract in this sense) are the transaction of barter. . . and the
present (or "cash") sale . . . .Because no promise is given in either of these
exchanges, there is no contract.
Id. § 1.1, at 4 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Because a consent theory em-
braces more than the enforcement of promises, the most appropriate terms to describe
contracting parties might be "transferor" and "transferee." For convenience, however,
the more conventional terms promisor and promisee will still occasionally be used here.
124. But see Cheung, supra note 33, at 23 ("The transactions conducted in the
market place entail outright or partial transfers of property rights among individual con-
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monly held and plausible conception of ownership that owning re-
sources gives one the right to possess, use, and dispose of them free
from the use or threat of force by others.1 25
In a modem society the chain between initial acquisition of re-
sources and their ultimate consumption can be quite long and compli-
cated. While controversies may exist, even among those who
acknowledge the legitimacy of property rights in principle, about the
proper mode of resource acquisitionI 26 and the proper manner of re-
source use,127 a valid transfer of rights must be conditioned on some
act of the rights holder. The allocative function that an entitlements
theory is devised, in part, to fulfill suggests that the way rights are
transferred is by consent. 128
In sum, legal enforcement is morally justified because the promisor
voluntarily performed acts that conveyed her intention to create a le-
gally enforceable obligation by transferring alienable rights. Within an
entitlements approach, contractual obligation, as distinct from other
types of legal obligation, is based on that consent.
B. Defining Consent
1. Consent and the Objective Theory of Contract. - At first blush, a con-
sent theory of contract may appear to some to be a version of a will
theory. Understanding the fundamental differences between the two
approaches, therefore, will assist an appreciation of the comparative
virtues of the consent theory.
A will theory bases contractual obligation on the fact that an obli-
gation was freely assumed. As was shown in Part I, a theory that bases
tracting parties."); Evers, Toward a Reformulation of the Law of Contracts, 1J. Liberta-
rian Stud. 3 (1977) (describing a "title-transfer theory" of contract based on property
rights); Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 Yale L.J. 472, 472 (1980)
(Contracts "provide for the exchange of property."); Macneil, Relational Contract:
What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 483, 523 ("[E]xchange relations...
presuppose some idea of property .. "). For a recent attempt to employ the concept
of property to explain the law of restitution and some issues of contract damages, see
Friedmann, supra note 97.
125. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 124, at 472. This idea is not a new one. See T.
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, reprinted in 20 Great Books of the Western World 311
(1952) ("[T]he power of private persons is exercised over the things they possess, and
consequently their dealings with one another as regards such things depend on their
own will, for instance in buying, selling, giving and so forth.").
126. See, e.g., L. Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations 32-56 (1977)
(critically assessing the labor theory of property acquisition); Epstein, Possession as the
Root of Title, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1221 (1979) (defending "first possession" as the means of
acquiring property); Rose, supra note 115 (distinguishing the labor, consent, and first
possession theories of property acquisition and discussing their respective merits).
127. See generally Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits.
Part I, 1 Law & Phil. 371 (1982) (assessing competing moral theories of torts); Coleman,
Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits. Part II, 2 Law & Phil. 5 (1983) (same).
128. But see supra note 113.
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contractual obligation on the existence of a "will to be bound" is hard
pressed to justify contractual obligation in the absence of an actual ex-
ercise of the will. It is difficult to see why one is legally or morally com-
mitted to perform an agreement that one did not actually intend to
commit oneself to and still hew to a theory that based the commitment
on its willful quality. This subjective component creates a tension be-
tween a will theory and the inescapable need of individuals in society
and those trying to administer a coherent legal system to rely on ap-
pearances-to rely on an individual's behavior that apparently
manifests their assent1 29 to a transfer of entitlements.
In contrast to a will theory, a consent theory's recognition of the
dependence of contractual obligation on a rights analysis is able to ac-
count for the normal objective-subjective relationship in contract law.
The concept of rights or entitlements is a social one whose principal
function is to specify boundaries within which individuals may operate
freely to pursue their respective individual ends and thereby provide
the basis for cooperative interpersonal activity. Lawyers tend to con-
centrate on the function entitlements notions play in specifying the
proper remedies for wrongful conduct, but given the uncertain justice
of any legal remedy, 130 a vital function of a system of well-defined enti-
tlements is the avoidance of disputes. And, while it is not unusual to
discuss avoiding disputes by raising the cost of misconduct and thereby
deterring "bad" persons,13' it is frequently overlooked that an entitle-
ments view must take a "good man" view of law at least as seriously as
it does a "bad man" view.' 3 2
The boundaries of individual discretion that are defined by a sys-
129. See supra note 121.
130. Cf. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application
of Restitutive Principles of'Justice, 32 Emory L.J. 937, 979 (1983) ("One of the tragedies
of justice is the necessity of objectifying the worth of subjectively valued rights, when
rights are expropriated and not bargained for.").
131. The "bad man" view of law was made famous by Justice Holmes:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man,
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables
him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897). For commentators who
employ a "bad man" view, see R. Posner, supra note 30, at 164-72; Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).
132. By focusing exclusively on the sanctions imposed for illegal conduct, a "bad
man" view underestimates the epistemological function of general principles and rules
of law. Properly crafted rules and principles supply vital information to "good" persons
(and their legal counsel) who seek to avoid violating the rights of others without regard
to the severity of the penalties that may attach to such conduct. See H.L.A. Hart, supra
note 85, at 86-88 (distinguishing the "internal" from the "external" aspect of obligatory
rules); F. Hayek, 1 Law, Legislation and Liberty 35-123 (1973) (describing the role of
rules in creating and preserving a "spontaneous order" of human interaction); Hegland,
Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1203 (1985) (defending use of rules and
principles against recent deconstructionist criticisms).
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tem of clear entitlements serve to allocate decision-making authority
among individuals. Vital information is thereby conveyed to all those
who might wish to avoid disputes and respect the rights of others, pro-
vided they know what those rights are. 133 Potential conflicts between
persons who might otherwise vie for control of a given resource are
thus avoided. Therefore, an entitlements theory demands that the
boundaries of protected domains be ascertainable, not only by judges
who must resolve disputes that have arisen, but, perhaps more impor-
tantly, by the affected persons themselves before any dispute occurs.
In contract law, this informational or "boundary defining" require-
ment means that an assent to alienate rights must be manifested in some
manner by one party to the other to serve as a criterion of enforcement.
Without a manifestation of assent that is accessible to all affected par-
ties, that aspect of a system of entitlements that governs transfers of
rights will fail to achieve its main function. At the time of the transac-
tion, it will have failed to identify clearly and communicate to both par-
ties (and to third parties) the rightful boundaries that must be
respected. Without such communication, parties to a transaction (and
third parties) cannot accurately ascertain what constitutes rightful con-
duct and what constitutes a commitment on which they can rely. Dis-
putes that might otherwise have been avoided will occur, and the
attendant uncertainties of the transfer process will discourage reliance.
While this imperative of a system of entitlements may initially
strike some as ad hoc, we react this way only because we are not used to
thinking of contractual obligation as arising from the transfer of rights.
The relationship between legal rules and entitlements theory is better
understood in the realm of property law, where the boundary defining
function of rights also necessitates an objective approach. No serious
theory would suggest that persons initially acquire rights to (unowned)
resources simply because they subjectively believe they have done so.
Rather, rights to unowned objects are acquired by performing some
demonstrable and meaningful act with respect to those objects. De-
pending on the theory of acquisition that is held and the conventions
that are adopted, the act required might be possessing or staking out
the resource, transforming it, or filing a claim to it with a claims of-
fice. 3 4 Each of these conventions objectively manifests ownership over
a previously unowned or abandoned resource by conveying to others
an unmistakeable claim to possess, control, and utilize the resource. 13 .
133. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 115, at 78-79 ("Possession now begins to look
even more like something that requires a kind of communication, and the original claim
to the property looks like a kind of speech, with the audience composed of all others
who might be interested in claiming the object in question.").
134. See, e.g., Baird &Jackson, supra note 108, at 301-11 (discussing the advan-
tages and disadvantages of various conventions used to record and transfer interests in
real and personal property).
135. See Rose, supra note 115, at 77 ("The clear-act principle suggests that the
common law defines acts of possession as some kind of slat emeni. As Blackstone said, the
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The analysis for contract law is similar. Requiring the consent of
the rights holder as a condition of a valid transfer of rights is absolutely
vital to a regime of entitlements for the reasons discussed above.' 3 6
But, whether one has consented to a transfer of rights under such a
regime generally depends not on one's subjective opinion about the
meaning of one's freely chosen words or conduct, but on the ordinary
meaning that is attached to them. Language itself-the way that assent
to a transfer is manifested-is as much a convention as those conven-
tions governing rights acquisitions. If the word "yes" ordinarily means
yes, then a subjective and unrevealed belief that "yes" means no is gen-
erally immaterial to a regime of entitlements allocation. Only a general
reliance on objectively ascertainable assertive conduct will enable a sys-
tem of entitlements to perform its allotted boundary-defining function.
Further, a legal theory that attempted to rest the rightful acquisi-
tion, use, or transfer of resources solely on subjective intentions could
not provide a coherent set of rights or entitlements. There is nothing
to prevent subjective intentions from conflicting with one another.
Therefore, to the extent a theory attempts to derive rights from such
intentions, it would produce "rights" that were necessarily in irrecon-
cilable conflict with each other. Such a theory would then need to ap-
peal to still other principles to resolve these conflicting claims of
"rights," but any such appeal would mean that this type of legal theory
was not a theory of rights at all.' 37
The function of a rights theory is to define the boundaries of per-
mitted human action 138 and resolve competing claims. 139 A coherent
rights theory will, therefore, allocate rights largely on the basis of fac-
acts must be a declaration of one's intent to appropriate." (citation omitted)). But cf.
Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 Wash. U.L.Q. 331, 357 (1983)
(Courts "regularly award title to the good faith trespasser, where they will not award it
to the trespasser who knows what he is doing at the time he enters the land in dispute.").
The tendency in the doctrine of adverse possession discussed by Helmholz may be
analogous to those circumstances in a consent theory of contract, discussed infra notes
154-60 and accompanying text, where the presumptive significance of objective assent
may be overcome by proof of the subjective understanding of the promisee.
136. See supra notes 109-28 and accompanying text.
137. That under a rights theory rights must be reconcilable is mentioned by R.
Nozick, supra note 67, at 166 ("Individual rights are co-possible; each person may exer-
cise his rights as he chooses."), and elaborated in Steiner, The Structure of a Set of
Compossible Rights, 74 J. Phil. 767 (1977) (describing the logical requirement that a
system of rights entails the compatible exercise-or "compossibility"-of designated
rights). On the role that this formal requirement plays in the formulation of substantive
rights, see Barnett, Pursuing Justice, supra note 107, at 58, 60.
138. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
139. Cf. J. Feinberg, supra note 99, at 152 ("[N]ot all claims put forward as valid
really are valid; and only the valid ones can be acknowledged as rights."); id. at 155 ("To
have a right is to have a claim against someone whose recognition as valid is called for by
some set of governing rules or moral principles."); Steiner, supra note 137, at 768
("Someone called upon to adjudicate between two persons whose actions are mutually
obstructive and each of whom is able to show that his own action falls within the range
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tors that minimize the likelihood of generating conflicting claims. In
this regard, objectively manifested conduct, which usually reflects sub-
jective intent, provides a far sounder basis for contractual obligation
than do subjectively held intentions. Evidence of subjective intent that
is extrinsic to the transaction and was unavailable to the other party is
relevant, if at all, only insofar as it helps a court to ascertain the "objec-
tive" meaning of certain terms. 140
What exact meaning must a court conclude was conveyed by a
promisor to a promisee to find that a contractual commitment was in-
curred? If consent is properly thought of as "objective" or "mani-
fested" assent, what is it that must be assented to for a contractual
obligation to arise? It is not enough that one manifests a commitment
or promises to perform or refrain from doing some act. Such a mani-
festation would be nothing more than a promise. 14 1 Contract theory
searches for the "extra" factor that, if present, justifies the legal en-
forcement of a commitment or promise.
An entitlements theory specifies that consent to a transfer of rights
is this factor. 142 The consent that is required is a manifestation of an in-
tention to alienate rights.143 In a system of entitlements where manifested
rights transfers are what justify the legal enforcement of agreements,
any such manifestation necessarily implies that one intends to be "le-
gally bound," to adhere to one's commitment. Therefore, the phrase
"a manifestation of an intention to be legally bound" 144 neatly captures
what a court should seek to find before holding that a contractual obli-
gation has been created. 145
Charles Fried maintains that a promisor incurs a moral obligation
denoted by a claimed right, will ... conclude that at least one of these two claimed
rights is invalid.").
140. See, e.g., Kabil Dev. Corp. v. Mignot, 279 Or. 151, 157-58, 566 P.2d 505,
508-09 (1977) (discussed in Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36
Stan. L. Rev. 1107, 1119 n.36 (1984)).
141. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2 (1979) ("A promise is a man-
ifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to
justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.").
142. See supra notes 117-128 and accompanying text.
143. Such a manifestation of intention to alienate rights can be direct or indirect.
The object of a direct rights transfer contract is to transfer alienable rights-for exam-
ple, rights to external possessions. The object of an indirect rights transfer contract is to
assure that someone else will exercise her inalienable rights-for example, the right to
one's labor-in a particular way by requiring a transfer of alienable rights (for example,
money damages) if there is no performance. See supra note 99; infra note 218; cf.
Green, supra note 123, at 95 (distinguishing between a "self-executing offer" and "an
offer to do or refrain from doing something").
144. Cf. Green, Is an Offer Always a Promise?, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 301, 302 (1928) (us-
ing the phrase, "an expression of will or consent to be answerable"); Lorenzen, Causa
and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 Yale L.J. 621, 646 (1919) ("Agreements
which are physically possible and legally permissible should, on principle, be enforcea-
ble ... if it was the intention of the parties to assume legal relations.").
145. Of course, a further requirement of contractual obligation in a system of enti-
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because she intentionally invokes a social convention whose purpose is
to cause others to expect the promised performance. 146 By contrast, a
consent theory specifies that a promisor incurs a contractual obligation
the legal enforcement of which is morally justifiable by manifesting as-
sent to legal enforcement and thereby invoking the institution of con-
tract. In the circumstances described by Fried, a promisor may have a
moral obligation to do what she promised. Without more she would
not have a legal obligation and a promisee would not have a legal right
to performance. 147 She incurs a contractual obligation to perform only
when she manifests to a promisee her intention to be legally bound.
The basis of contractual obligation is not promising per se. The basis
of contract is consent.
It is not paradoxical to adhere to an "objective" notion of consent
that is based on just those ordinary words and deeds of persons that are
commonly understood to reflect their subjective assent to be legally
bound, notwithstanding that they may not have in fact meant to convey
the commonly understood meaning.1 48 A consent analysis is genuinely
interested in the actual intentions of the parties, but we never have di-
rect access to another individual's subjective mental state. We thus
must always learn the meaning of terms by comparing (1) the conduct
of persons with their words, or (2) their conduct and words in one con-
text with those in another, or (3) one person's conduct and words with
another person's conduct and words. t49 Even in a subjective theory,
evidence of subjective assent must be manifested at some point-if only
from the witness stand or in self-serving documents.
Therefore, the only difference in the treatment of evidence of sub-
jective intent between subjective and objective approaches to contract
concerns evidence of subjective intent that is extrinsic to the transaction.
At the time of formation, such extrinsic evidence is unavailable to the
other party who witnesses what did or did not appear to be an assent to
a transfer of rights. Since, by definition, this information is unavailable
to the other party at the time assent is manifested, its later use by a
court (following a subjective approach) defeats the function that con-
sent performs in clearly defining and communicating the boundaries of
rightful conduct at the time of the transaction.150 A truly subjective ap-
tiements is that the rights transferred be valid and alienable. See supra notes 99-100
and accompanying text.
146. See C. Fried, supra note 8, at 16.
147. Cf. I A. Corbin, supra note 1, § 110, at 490 ("To be enforceable, the promise
must be accompanied by some other factor.").
148. Similarly, it is not considered paradoxical that the criminal legal system gener-
ally refuses to allow jury verdicts to be impeached by evidence of innocence not
presented at trial.
149. This list may not be exhaustive.
150. Although a promisee may rightfully rely on the objective manifestation, if she
does not in fact rely on this manifestation it would not serve the boundary defining
purpose to enforce it. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
1986]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
proach to contractual intent would admit this evidence and an objective
one would exclude it.
The fact that objective consent generally takes precedence over
subjective assent does not jeopardize the liberty interest that rights
have been formulated to protect. No one suggests that an objective
approach to either rights acquisition or resource use is inconsistent
with the liberty interest that the scheme of private rights was intended
to serve. Rather, these approaches to rights acquisition and resource
use are favored precisely because they respect and protect the rights
and liberty interests of others, whose plans and expectations would be
severely limited if they were not entitled to rely on things as they ap-
pear to be and to take the assertive conduct of others at face value.151
The same is true in contract law. Volitional acts-words or
deeds-that manifest assent to transfer entitlements presumptively
bind the actor regardless of subjective intent. This "strict liability" the-
ory of contract is appealing precisely because it too recognizes the le-
gitimate rights and liberty interests in others. 152 Lon Fuller noted over
forty years ago that a law of contract which seeks to secure a realm of
private autonomy has a "bipartisan" quality and that this quality gives
rise to an objective theory of contract. 153
In a consent theory, then, contracts are interpreted with an eye
151. A correlative notion is the concept of legal as opposed to actual notice. Cf. 3
J. Pomeroy, EquityJurisprudence § 842, at 292 (5th ed. Symons 1941) ("If ignorance of
the law were generally allowed to be pleaded, there could be no security in legal rights,
no certainty in judicial investigations, no finality in litigations." (footnote omitted)).
152. Cf. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2J. Legal Stud. 151, 168-69 (1973):
The doctrine of strict liability holds that proof that the defendant caused harm
creates [a] . . . presumption [in favor of the plaintiff] because [under the doc-
trine of strict liability] proof of the nonreciprocal source of the harm is suffi-
cient to upset the balance where one person must win and the other must lose.
There is no room to consider, as part of the prima facie case, allegations that
the defendant intended to harm the plaintiff, or could have avoided the harm
he caused by the use of reasonable care. The choice is plaintiff or defendant
153. In distinguishing his concept of "private autonomy" from a will theory, Fuller
observed that:
The principle of private autonomy, properly understood, is in no way in-
consistent with an 'objective' interpretation of contracts. Indeed, we may go
farther and say that the so-called objective theory of interpretation in its more
extreme applications becomes understandable only in terms of the principle of
private autonomy. . . . [This theory] rests upon the need for promoting the
security of transactions. Yet security of transactions presupposes "transac-
tions," in other words, acts of private parties which have a law-making and
right-altering function.
Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 808 (1941). Of course, the
security of transactions is just one among many functions performed by the institution
of rights. See also Raz, Book Review, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 916, 936 (1982):
The objective test of contract formation is not an embarrassment to the view
that the purpose of contract law is to support the practice of undertaking volun-
tary obligations. On the contrary, it is required by it. Paradoxical though it
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towards honoring the actual intentions of the parties. But where the
subjective intentions of one party have not been manifested to the
other, only the "reasonable" or objective interpretation of the commit-
ment will establish the clear boundaries required by an entitlements
approach.
There is nothing novel or revolutionary about contract law's con-
cern for the protection of reliance by promisees. One of the most im-
portant functions of the institution of property rights is to legally
protect certain expectations of the rights holder so that she may rely on
the continued use of certain resources. For example, an owner of real
property relies upon her title when she invests in building a house or a
factory upon it, because she expects that her title will be honored by a
legal system in the future. She also relies upon her title when she
leaves town on vacation, expecting her property to still be hers when
she returns.
In a consent theory, reliance on the words or deeds of another is
"justified" only (1) when and to the extent that such words or deeds
have a commonly understood meaning within the relevant context or
when a special meaning can be shown to have been understood by both
parties to this transaction, and (2) when this meaning indicates a con-
sent to transfer legitimately acquired and alienable rights. The hard
work facing any legal system based on entitlements includes determin-
ing what constitutes "valid" title and what acts constitute "consent."
Only when these concepts are properly defined can we "expect" the
legal system to act in a predictable enough manner to make our reli-
ance "reasonable" or "justified."
2. The Proper Limits of the Objective Approach. - A consent theory also
explains the limits of the objective approach-why the objective inter-
pretation of a party's acts will yield, at times, to proof of a different
subjective understanding of one or both parties.' 5 4
To find the presence of consent, what matters is the meaning that
is generally attached to some given word or conduct indicating assent-
a meaning to which both parties have access. In contract law, this gen-
eralized meaning therefore becomes the presumptive meaning. 15 5 The
presumption can be rebutted, not by reference to the promisor's sub-
jective intent in performing the consenting acts, but either by proof of
any special meaning that the parties' behavior reveals they held in com-
mon, thereby negating the social function of accepting the generalized
sounds, it is in order to protect the practice from abuse and debasement that
the law recognizes the validity of contracts that are not voluntary obligations.
154. See Eisenberg, supra note 140, at 1117-27 (discussing what limits should
properly be placed on the applicability of the objective approach).
155. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 comment a (1979) ("Words are
used as conventional symbols of mental states, with standardized meanings based on
habitual or customary practice. Unless a different intention is shown, language is inter-
preted in accordance with its generally prevailing meaning.").
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meaning, 15 6 or by the promisor's proof that the listener did not actually
understand the "reasonable" meaning to be the intended meaning. 15 7
A promisee is not "justified" in relying on the ordinary meaning of a
promisor's words or deeds where a special meaning can be proved to
have been actually understood by both parties. Similarly, the enforce-
ment of the "reasonable" meaning serves no constructive purpose
where it was not the promisee's actual understanding. 15 8 The bound-
ary-determining function' 59 of a rights analysis simply does not require
that such reliance be protected or such a meaning enforced.' 6 0
This also explains why the misuse of a particular term by party A
who was unaware of its ordinary meaning would not bind A if it could
be shown that B, the other party, was made aware of this mistake by the
circumstances of the transaction.' 6 1 Proof of this occurrence would
show that the normal boundary-defining function of an objective ap-
proach designed to protect parties in B's position had been satisfied by
B's actual knowledge of A's meaning. A consent theory, therefore, ex-
plains both why parties are free to shift away from the ordinary mean-
ings of words or deeds either intentionally or inadvertently, and why, if
a shift by both cannot be shown, the ordinary or "objective" meaning
will govern.
Persons generally use conventional words and actions to convey
their intentions with a considerable degree of accuracy. Because of
this, the outcomes of cases decided by an objective approach based
156. See, e.g., Weinberg v. Edelstein, 201 Misc. 343, 345, 110 N.Y.S.2d 806, 808
(Sup. Ct. 1952) (A court cannot "rely upon naked dictionary definitions" but must de-
termine meaning according to "the practices and customs of the trade."); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 201 comment a (1979). But cf. id. § 201 comment c ("But par-
ties who used a standardized term in an unusual sense obviously run the risk that their
agreement will be misinterpreted in litigation.").
157. Permitting a promisor to contest whether a promisee had in fact relied upon
the objective meaning is quite consistent with the boundary-defining function of con-
tract law in a consent theory. Assuming that a promisor can prove such an allegation,
the reliance that the objective approach is designed to protect is nonexistent, and per-
mitting such proof would provide few opportunities for fraud. In this regard a consent
theory conforms to the conventional interpretation of the objective theory. See, e.g.,
Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 127 Mo. App. 383, 392, 105 S.W. 777,
780 (1907) (holding that defendant is liable for breach of contract if a reasonable person
would have understood him as having accepted plaintiff's offer and plaintiff in fact so
understood defendant).
158. See E. Farnsworth, supra note 13, § 7.9, at 483-92.
159. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
160. Cf. E. Farnsworth, supra note 13, § 7.9, at 484 ("Since a contract involves two
parties, however, the search for meaning begins with the meaning attached by both par-
ties to the contract language; each needs the other's assent."); U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1978)
(" 'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or
course of performance as provided in this Act.").
161. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 (1979) (specifying when
mistake of one party makes a contract voidable).
[Vol. 86:269
CONSENT THEORY
upon the ordinary and natural meaning of words and other assertive
conduct will differ from those decided by a subjective approach only in
unusual circumstances. Most cases would come out the same in either
event. But unlike a will theory, a consent theory, because it is based on
fundamental notions of entitlements, can explain both why we gener-
ally enforce the objective manifestation of consent when it differs from
subjective intent and the exceptions where evidence of subjective intent
will prevail.
C. Determining Contractual Obligation in a Consent Theory
1. The Presumptive Nature of Consent. - Richard Epstein has sug-
gested that legal principles used to determine obligation can best be
thought of as presumptive in nature.1 62 That is, legal principles which
attempt to describe in a general fashion what obligations will result
from certain actions ought not to be applied in an "absolute" fashion.
Rather, legal principles ought to state a "prima facie case" of legal obli-
gation that describes the normal or presumptive connection between
specified acts and their legal consequences.1 63 Any such presumption
of obligation, however, may be "rebutted" if other facts are proved to
have existed that are generally recognized by a legal system as under-
mining the normal significance of the prima facie case. Such responses
or "defenses" to the prima facie case are themselves only presump-
tively compelling. They in turn may be rebutted by still other facts al-
leged by the person seeking relief. In this way the principles or
elements that determine legal obligation come in "stages."' 164
In a consent theory, absent the assertion of a valid defense, proof
of consent to a transfer of alienable rights (plus breach) is legally suffi-
cient to obtain a judgment for breach of contract. Consent is prima
facie binding because of its usual connection with subjective assent
(thereby protecting the reliance interest of the promisor) and because
people usually have access only to the manifested intentions of others
162. See Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 556 (1973)
(describing the operation of staged pleadings in legal analysis); cf. Eisenberg, supra note
1, at 641 ("Putting the problem in the language of civil procedure, the principles that
address the enforceability of promises should determine whether breach of a given type
of promise gives rise to a legal complaint. Issues concerning the quality of individual
promises should then be matters of defense.").
163. An approach that constructs presumptively applicable legal rules-the prima
facie case-based on "normal" circumstances and then allows certain defenses based on
"abnormal" circumstances that undercut the appropriateness of the prima facie case
would serve to minimize (though perhaps not entirely eliminate) the problem of the
"open texture" of general rules that was noted supra note 85 and accompanying text.
164. Cf. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3J.
Legal Stud. 165 (1974) (offering an expanded description of those circumstances that
rebut the normal presumption embodied in the prima facie case of tort that persons will
be held strictly liable for the injuries they cause); Epstein, supra note 152, at 166-74
(having volitionally caused harm to another, A is prima facie liable for the injury, but, if
A successfully pleads a valid defense, B may not be entitled to a judgment).
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(thereby protecting the reliance interest of the promisee and others as
well as the "security of transactions"). The next two sections will dis-
cuss the prima facie case of consent and the role that defenses to con-
sent play in a consent theory.
2. Establishing the Prima Facie Case of Consent. - There are two ways
to manifest one's intention to be legally bound. The first is to deliber-
ately "channel" one's behavior through the use of a legal formality' 65
in such a way as to explicitly convey a certain meaning- that of having
an intention to be legally bound-to another. This is the formal means
of consenting. The second is by indirectly or implicitly conveying this
meaning by other types of behavior. This is the informal means of
consenting.
a. Formal Consent. - For a considerable part of the history of the
common law, the principal way of creating what we now think of as a
contractual obligation was to cast one's agreement in the form of a
sealed writing.1 66 Actions based on informal promises were subject to
the defense of wager, and this seriously undermined a promisee's abil-
ity to obtain enforcement.167 The rise of the action of assumpsit can be
understood as the way common law judges responded to competitive
pressures1 68 to escape this (and other) procedural barriers to the en-
forcement of informal promises.
As was noted above, 169 however, the emergence of assumpsit as
the principal action of contractual enforcement required the develop-
ment of a doctrinal limitation on the enforcement of commitments-
that is, the doctrine of consideration.17 0 This development eventually
resulted in the ascendancy of the bargain theory of consideration,
which had the unintended consequence of creating doctrinal problems
for the enforcement of formal commitments where there was no bar-
gained-for consideration. Notwithstanding their ancient history, formal
commitments, such as those under seal, came to be thought of as "ex-
ceptions" to the "normal" requirement of consideration. Expressions
such as "a seal imports consideration" or is "a substitute for considera-
tion" became commonplace.' 7 '
165. See Fuller, supra note 153, at 801 (The use of legal formality "offers a legal
framework into which the party may fit his actions, or, to change the figure, it offers
channels for the legally effective expression of intention.").
166. See A. Simpson, supra note 75, at 88-90.
167. Id. at 137-44.
168. See Helmholz, Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio, 91 Law Q. Rev. 406 (1975) (describ-
ing the competition between the common law courts and the ecclesiastical courts in the
enforcement of informal promises).
169. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
170. The Statute of Frauds, passed in 1677, was another such limitation. See A.
Simpson, supra note 75, at 599-600.
171. See, e.g., In re Conrad's Estate, 333 Pa. 561, 563, 3 A.2d 697, 699 (1938);
Aller v. Aller, 40 N.J.L. 446 (1878); cf. Crane, The Magic of the Private Seal, 15 Colum.
L. Rev. 24, 25-26 (1915) ("The books frequently spoke of a seal as implying a considera-
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Despite such cases and restatements, 172 formal promises have had
an uncertain place in the law of contract 173 because they lacked a theo-
retical underpinning. In a climate of opinion dominated by notions of
"bargain" and "induced reliance," where there is no bargain and no
demonstrable reliance to support enforcement, the presence of a mean-
ingful formality may not be enough to satisfy a court. 174 Not even the
renowned contract writings of Lon Fuller 175 were able to change the
formal contract's orphan status.
A consent theory of contract, however, provides the missing theo-
retical foundation of formal contracts and explains their proper place in
a well-crafted law of contract. The voluntary use of a recognized for-
mality by a promisor manifests to a promisee an intention to be legally
bound in as unambiguous a manner as possible. As one court noted:
If a party has fully and absolutely expressed his intention in a
writing sealed and delivered, with the most solemn sanction
known to our law, what should prevent its execution where
there is no fraud or illegality? 176
Formal contracts ought to be an "easy" case of contractual enforce-
ment, but prevailing theories that require bargained-for consideration,
induced reliance, or even economic "efficiency" would have a hard time
explaining why.' 77 In a consent theory, by contrast, there need be no
tion; but the correct statement of the rule is that a sealed instrument required no consid-
eration." (footnote omitted)).
172. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 95 (1979) (specifying condi-
tions necessary for a sealed writing to be binding without consideration).
173. See C. Fried, supra note 8, at 28-29 ("[T]he trend away from the seal as an
anachronistic relic and the narrow, episodic nature of the statutory exceptions leaves the
doctrine of consideration as very much the norm.").
174. It is difficult to determine how much of this decline is due to theoretical rea-
sons and how much is due to the uncertain significance of certain formalities claimed to
constitute seals. Compare Chancellor Kent's opinion in Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. 239,
245-46 (N.Y. 1810) ("A scrawl with a pen is not a seal, and deserves no notice ....
The calling a paper a deed will not make it one, if it want the requisite formalities ....
The policy of the rule consists in giving ceremony and solemnity to the execution of
important instruments, by means of which the attention of the parties is more certainly
and effectually fixed, and frauds less likely to be practiced upon the unwary.") with 1892
N.Y. Laws, ch. 677 § 13 ("The private seal of a person. . . to any instrument or writing
shall consist of. . .the word 'seal,' or the letters 'L.S.,' opposite the signature."). See
also Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 660 (describing the erosion of "the elements of ritual
and personification"); Fuller, supra note 153, at 823 (questioning "whether with our
present-day routinized and institutionalized ways of doing business a 'blanket formality'
can achieve the desiderata which form is intended to achieve.").
175. See Fuller, supra note 153, at 822-23 ("The desiderata underlying the use of
formalities will retain their relevance as long as men make promises to one another.").
176. Aller v. Aller, 40 N.J.L. 446, 451 (1878); see also Handbook of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings 194 (1925) ("I
don't see why a man should not be able to make himself liable if he wishes to do so."
(statement of S. Williston)).
177. For example, when there is no separate consideration for making an offer ir-
revocable for a certain period of time, a bargain theory of consideration would have a
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underlying bargain or demonstrable reliance for such a commitment to
be properly enforced.
The same holds true-as Lon Fuller again recognized-for nomi-
nal consideration and for false recitals of consideration.17 8 A consent
theory acknowledges that, if properly evidenced, a recital by the parties
that "consideration" exists may fulfill the channeling function of for-
malities, whether or not any bargained-for consideration for the com-
mitment in fact exists. If it is widely known that the written phrase "in
return for good and valuable consideration" means that one intends to
make a legally binding commitment, then these words will fulfill a chan-
neling function as well as, and perhaps better than, a seal or other for-
mality.179 The current rule that the falsity of such a statement permits
a court to nullify a transaction because of a lack of consideration' 80 is
therefore contrary to a consent theory of contract.18 1
b. Informal Consent. - Consent to transfer rights can be express or
implied. Formal contracts expressing consent to transfer alienable
rights pose no problem for a consent theory. The enforcement of in-
formal commitments where evidence of legally binding intentions is
more obscure, however, has plagued contract law for centuries.' 8 2 In
such agreements courts must infer assent to be legally bound from the
circumstances or the "considerations"'18 3 or "causa" 18 4 that induced
the parties' actions.
difficult time explaining the enforceability of such "firm offers" as are recognized by
U.C.C. § 2-205 (1977), which requires neither consideration nor detrimental reliance
for enforcement to be obtained.
178. See Fuller, supra note 153, at 820 ("Thie proper ground for upholding these
decisions would seem to be that the desiderata underlying the use of formalities are here
satisfied by the fact that the parties have taken the trouble to cast their transaction in the
form of an exchange.").
179. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 660-61 ("[I]t can be safely assumed that par-
ties who falsely cast a nonbargain promise as a bargain do so for the express purpose of
making the promise legally enforceable.").
180. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 comment b (1979); see, e.g.,
Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29, 32 (1861) ("The consideration of one cent is, plainly, in this
case, merely nominal, and intended to be so."); Shepard v. Rhodes, 7 R.I. 470, 475
(1863) (Consideration of one dollar was "a mere nominal consideration." (emphasis in
original)).
181. But see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87(1)(a) (1979) (qualifying the
prohibition of § 71 to permit recitals of purported consideration to render a "firm" offer
enforceable as an option contract).
182. See Lorenzen, supra note 144, at 646 (criticizing limits placed by Anglo-Amer-
ican law on ways in which "intent to assume an obligation" can be shown).
183. On this archaic usage of the word "consideration," see A. Simpson, supra note
75, at 321 ("Pleadings in assumpsit had always included matters of inducement.").
184. For the possible parallels between consideration and the civilian concept of
"causa," see Mason, The Utility of Consideration-A Comparative View, 41 Colum. L.
Rev. 825, 825-31 (1941); cf. Lorenzen, supra note 144, at 646 ("There is in reality no
definable 'doctrine' of causa.").
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(i) Bargaining as Evidence of Consent. - Within a consent theory, bar-
gained-for consideration would perform a channelling role.' 85 The fact
that a person has received something of value in return for a "promise"
may indeed indicate that this promise was an expression of intention to
transfer rights.' 8 6 Moreover, in some circumstances where gratuitous
transfers are unusual, the receipt of a benefit in return for a promise
should serve as objective notice to the promisor that the promise has
been interpreted by the other party to be legally binding.
1 8 7
Although the existence of a bargain or other motivation for a trans-
action may be good evidence of the sort of agreement that has been
made, in a consent theory the absence of consideration does not pre-
clude the application of legal sanctions if other indicia of consent are
present. To return to the examples given by Fried,1 88 if it can be
proved that a party voluntarily consented to be legally bound to keep
an offer to transfer rights open, to release a debt, to modify an obliga-
tion, or to pay for past favors, these commitments are enforceable (pro-
vided that other contract requirements such as acceptance are met).
Where bargaining is the norm-as it is in most sales transactions-
there is little need for the law to require explicit proof of an intent to be
legally bound, such as an additional formality, 8 9 or even proof of the
existence of a bargain. In such circumstances, if an arms-length agree-
ment to sell can be proved, there presumptively has been a manifesta-
tion of intent to be legally bound. For this reason, the Uniform
Commercial Code's stricture that "[a] contract for the sale of goods
may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including
conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a con-
tract"' 9 0 is entirely consonant with a consent theory.
185. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 75 comment a (1979) ("Since the
principle that bargains are binding is widely understood and is reinforced in many situa-
tions by custom and convention, the fact of bargain ... tends to satisfy the cautionary
and channelling functions of form.").
186. Cf. P. Atiyah, supra note 123, at 184 ("[A] very common justification for treat-
ing a promise as binding is that the promise is evidence, is an admission, of the existence
of some other obligation already owed by the promisor. By making an explicit promise,
the promisor concedes or admits the existence and extent of the preexisting
obligation.").
187. The duties, if any, that receipt of a nongratuitous benefit imposes on the recip-
ient are beyond the scope of this Article, except to note that such receipt may manifest
the recipient's intent to be legally bound to a contemporaneous commitment.
188. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Note that in most of these cases
formalities adequate to indicate consent were present.
189. See Fuller, supra note 153, at 806 (The channelling function of formality "has
no place where men's activities are already divided into definite, clear-cut business cate-
gories .... It is for this reason that important transactions on the stock and produce
markets can safely be carried on in the most 'informal' manner."). Formality might well
be required, however, if it were the trade custom or if the transaction was particularly
large or unusual in some other respect.
190. U.C.C. § 2-204 (1977).
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In a legal system animated by a consent approach, the recognition
that "consideration" is only presumptive evidence of consent and that
consent can be shown by other means might produce results that corre-
spond remarkably to current practice. To avoid unnecessary confusion
and error, however, it is important to understand the theoretical
framework.' 9 '
(ii) Reliance as Evidence of Consent. - A consent theory also identifies
those circumstances where the presence of reliance provides an ade-
quate substitute for the traditional requirement of consideration. If the
primary function of consideration is to serve as one way of manifesting
assent to be legally bound, and not as a requirement of a prima facie
case of contractual obligation, then asserting the equivalence of reli-
ance and consideration 92 is less problematic. Expenditures made by a
promisee in reliance on the words and conduct of the promisor may
prove as much about the nature of this transaction as the existence of
consideration, especially where the reliance is or should be known to
the promisor.193
Suppose that A makes a substantial promise to B-for example, a
promise to convey land. The promise is clear, but it is ambiguous as to
its intended legal effect. Does A intend to be bound and subject to
legal enforcement if she reneges, or is she merely stating her current
view of her future intentions? Now suppose that B announces to A his
intention to rely on A's promise in a substantial way-for example, by
building a house on the land-and that A says nothing. Suppose fur-
ther that B commences construction and observes A watching in si-
lence. It would seem that under such circumstances A's ambiguous
legal intent has been clarified. By remaining silent in the face of reli-
ance so substantial that B would not have undertaken it without a legal
commitment from A-A could not reasonably have believed that B in-
tended to make a gift to her of the house-A has manifested an inten-
tion to be legally bound. 194
In this manner, a promisor's silence while observing substantial re-
liance on the promise by the promisee can manifest the promisor's as-
191. As Fuller, supra note 153, at 824 concludes:
[A]n original attack on these problems would arrive at some conclusions sub-
stantially equivalent to those which result from the doctrine of consideration as
now formulated. What needs abolition is not the doctrine of consideration but
a conception of the legal method which assumes that the doctrine can be un-
derstood and applied without reference to the ends it serves. When we have
come again to define consideration in terms of its underlying policies the prob-
lem of adapting it to new conditions will largely solve itself.
192. See, e.g., P. Atiyah, supra note 123, at 184-89.
193. See id. at 192-95 (discussing the evidentiary value of reliance on a promise).
194. See, e.g., Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930); Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H.
393 (1882); Roberts-Horsfield v. Gedicks, 94 N.J. Eq. 82, 118 A. 275 (1922). In each of
these cases, the promisor remained silent in the face of substantial reliance on a promise




sent to the promisee.19 5 In a consent theory, if consent is proved, then
enforcement is warranted even if a bargain or a formality is absent.
As was discussed above,' 9 6 when we seek to discern "reasonable"
(or prudent) reliance on a promise, a conclusion cannot be reached that
is independent of the perceived enforceability of the promise, which
brings us full circle to the question of enforceability with which we
started. A theory based only on reliance cannot, therefore, answer this
question. By contrast, in a consent theory, reliance is legally protected
(and therefore deemed to be justified) only if it is reliance on a mani-
fested intention to be legally bound.1 9 7 Reliance on a commitment that
is something less than a manifested intention to be legally bound is not
legally protected and is undertaken at the promisee's own risk.
The only assessment of "reasonableness" that is required in a con-
sent theory of contractual obligation is an assessment of the "reason-
able," or probable, meaning of the promisor's words and conduct.
However difficult such an interpretive inquiry into meaning might
sometimes be, it is not plagued with the same kind of circularity that
attaches to an assessment of "reasonable reliance." Interpretation of
meaning in the contractual context is a matter of determining either (a)
the usual nonlegal meaning of words, (b) the special meaning of legal
terms of art or formalities that have been freely employed by the par-
ties,' 9 8 or (c) some other special meaning jointly understood by the
parties. 199 In any event, this is the sort of inquiry all of us routinely
engage in every day when we communicate.
20 0
By providing a clearer criterion of enforceability that is available to
the parties, a consent theory encourages informed action. Once the legal
standard for contractual enforcement is known to be consent, who is to
195. Cf. McCormick on Evidence § 270, at 799 (3d ed. 1984) ("If a statement is
made by another person in the presence of a party to the action, containing assertions of
facts which, if untrue, the party would under all circumstances naturally be expected to
deny, his failure to speak has traditionally been receivable against him as an admission."
(footnote omitted)).
196. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
197. This is subject to the qualification that courts will enforce subjective agree-
ment where it is proved. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
198. An ideal formality is an act that is so bizarre that it has no "normal" meaning
other than the legal one, so that no "reasonable" person who did not intend the legal
effect would ever have performed the act. Lighting a candle and dripping the wax on a
document and then impressing in the wax one's seal was an act of a suitably bizarre
nature. When a "sealed" document could be executed by preprinting the letters "L.S."
after the place for a signature, the act quite obviously lost this character. See supra note
174.
199. This meaning would include any special usages employed within a particular
community. See, e.g., Weinberg v. Edelstein, 201 Misc. 343, 345, 110 N.Y.S.2d 806,
808 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
200. See H.L.A. Hart, supra note 85, at 123 ("General terms would be useless to us
as a medium of communication unless there were ... familiar, generally unchallenged
cases.").
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say what conduct is then "reasonable" or prudent? It may be prudent
to rely on a commitment that is known to be unenforceable, given other
things that the promisee may know about the promisor, or it may not.
This is not for a court to decide. It should by now be clear, however,
that a consent theory would identify instances of contractual obligation
that a bargain theory would ignore and thereby would better protect
and facilitate reliance: one need not have relied on a bargain to be
protected in a consent theory.
Once it is determined that reliance is protected because (and
therefore when) it is based on consent, a court must still decide how
much reliance is to be protected-that is, what is the extent of liability
for consequences caused by a breach of an admittedly enforceable obli-
gation?201 The standard approach is to adopt a "foreseeability" 20 2 as-
sessment of liability that is much the same kind of prudential or
predictive judgment that is employed in assessing the existence of reli-
ance-based obligation: what would a promisor have reasonably ex-
pected a promisee to have done in reliance on the contract? But much
the same problem exists for this issue of liability that was seen above
with respect to the issue of obligation.20 3 Here, as there, what most
persons will do depends on their perception of what the legal rule is
concerning the extent of liability, and therefore such a prediction can-
not itself determine the legal rule.
Just as a consent theory addresses the problem of obligation by
employing the criterion of "consent to obligation," it would handle the
problem of extent of liability by employing the criterion of "consent to
liability." This is much the same answer as was suggested by Justice
Holmes in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co. 20 4 and has been
called the "tacit-assent" test.2 0 5
201. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 651 ("[T]he determination of what kinds of
promises the law should enforce is tightly linked with the extent to which various kinds of
promises should be enforced." (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)).
202. See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 355, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
203. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
204. 190 U.S. 540, 545 (1903) (knowledge of extent of liability "'must be brought
home to the party sought to be charged, under such circumstances that he ntst knou, that
the person he contracts with reasonably believes that he accepts the contract with the
special condition attached to it'" (emphasis added) (quoting British Columbia Saw-Mill
Co. v. Nettleship, 3 L.R.-C.P. 499, 509 (1868)); see also Hooks Smelting Co. v. Planters'
Compress Co., 72 Ark. 275, 286-87, 79 S.W. 1052, 1056 (1904) (employing tacit assent
test); 0. Holmes, The Common Law 236-37 (M. Howe ed. 1963) ("[N]otice, even at the
time of making the contract, of the special circumstances out of which special damages
would arise in case of breach, is not sufficient unless the assumption of that risk is to be
taken as having fairly entered into the contract."); C. McCormick, A Handbook on the
Law of Damages § 141, at 578-79 (1935) (citing other cases that follow Globe in employ-
ing a tacit assent test).
205. See E. Farnsworth, supra note 13, § 12.14, at 875 (describing the tacit assent
test and noting that it has been rejected by most jurisdictions); U.C.C. § 2-715 comment
2 (1977) ("The 'tacit agreement' test for the recovery of consequential damages is re-
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While some have objected to the often fictional nature of such
"tacit" consent,20 6 the source of this problem lies not with a consent
theory. It lies instead with the centuries-old judicial reluctance to en-
force express clauses that specify the extent of liability where such
clauses differ from the standard for damages that the courts would ap-
ply on their own. 20 7 With this as the legal background, why would ra-
tional economizing parties negotiate such a clause unless they strongly
disagreed with that background and could devise a way to subvert it?
By recognizing contracting parties' right to consent to extent of liability
as well as to obligation, we can anticipate fictional "tacit" assent to be
supplanted by actual agreements-whether implied or expressed-
when parties disagree with the background rule established by the
courts.
2 08
To the extent, however, that parties can freely "opt out" of com-
plete liability for all forseeable consequential damages, the adopting of
a consent theory in this area is less pressing than it is at the level of
obligation. For most parties know that they are entering into a contract
and, if so, they can and do provide for clauses that limit by consent the
consequences for which they may be liable. In contrast, if a consent
theory is not employed to assess the existence of an obligation, parties
who do not know that they are contracting cannot always or easily take
steps to avoid an obligation that might be imposed upon them.
In sum, bargained-for consideration and nonbargained-for reli-
ance are equivalent to the extent that the existence of either in a trans-
action may manifest the intentions of one or both of the parties to be
legally bound. In any case, the absence of either bargained-for consid-
eration or reliance will not bar the enforcement of a transfer of entitle-
ments that can be proved in some other way-for example, by a formal
written document or by adequate proof of a sufficiently unambiguous
verbal commitment. 20 9
jected."). But see Murrow v. First Nat'l Bank, 261 Ark. 568, 550 S.W.2d 429 (1977)
(retaining tacit-assent test).
206. See, e.g., C. McCormick, supra note 204, § 141, at 580 ("It adds the fiction of
a tacit promise to the original fiction of 'contemplation'....").
207. See Note, Liquidated Damages Recovery Under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 862, 866 (1982) ("Where the actual damage resulting
from a breach was small or nonexistent, some courts used equitable principles to avoid
enforcing a liquidated damage clause." (citation omitted)); see also A. Simpson, supra
note 75, at 118-25 (describing the decline of conditioned penal bond).
208. See, e.g., A. Polinsky, supra note 28, at 25 (contract law provides gap-filling
terms that minimize the costs of transacting by accommodating the intentions of most
parties); R. Posner, supra note 30, at 69 (One economic function of contract law "is to
reduce the complexity and hence the cost of transactions by supplying a set of normal
terms that, in the absence of a law of contracts, the parties would have to negotiate
expressly.").
209. It is not being suggested here that such prophylactic measures that serve an
evidentiary function-such as a statute of frauds, a parol evidence rule, or certain formal
requirements-are inappropriate in a consent theory. Cf. Lorenzen, supra note 144, at
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3. Contract Defenses: Rebutting the Prima Fade Case of Consent. - Con-
sent, either formal or informal, is required to make out a prima facie
case of contractual obligation. This means that, in the absence of an
"affirmative" defense to the prima facie case of contractual obligation,
the manifested intention of a party to transfer alienable rights will jus-
tify the enforcement of such a commitment. Traditional contract de-
fenses can be understood as describing circumstances that, if proved to
have existed, deprive the manifestation of assent of its normal moral,
and therefore legal, significance. These defenses may be clustered into
three groups, each of which undermines the prima facie case of consent
in a different way.
The first group of defenses-duress, misrepresentation, and (pos-
sibly) unconscionability2 I-describes circumstances where the mani-
festation of an intention to be legally bound has been obtained
improperly by the promisee. The manifestation of assent either was
improperly coerced by the promisee2t1 or was based on misinformation
for which' the promisee was responsible. 2 12 The second group-inca-
pacity, infancy, and intoxication-describes attributes of the promisor
that indicate a lack of ability to assert meaningful assent. The third
group-mistake, impracticability, and frustration-stem from the in-
ability to fully express in any agreement all possible contingencies that
might affect performance. Each describes those types of events (a)
whose nonoccurrence was arguably a real, but tacit assumption upon
which consent was based, and (b) for which the promisee should bear
the risk of occurrence.2 13 Each type of defense thus is distinguished by
the way it undermines the normal, presumed significance of consent.
But all valid contract defenses describe general circumstances where
the appearance of assent tends to lack its normal moral significance.
These traditional contract defenses would function in a consent
theory, as they do currently, to preserve the actual voluntariness of
rights transfer, in those rare cases where consent has been improperly
coerced or where we are willing to acknowledge other circumstances,
644 (The law may "require certain formalities for the prevention of fraud, or as a guar-
antee, so far as it is legally possible to provide such, that the contract in question repre-
sents the serious and deliberate will of the parties. But within the limits so outlined it is
submitted the will of the parties to assume legal relations should control.").
210. For analyses of unconscionability that would place it in this category of de-
fenses, see Epstein, supra note 54; Leff, supra note 54.
211. See generally Philips, Are Coerced Agreements Involuntary, 3 Law & Phil. 133
(1984) (distinguishing coerced and involuntary agreements).
212. Cf. Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12 Ga. L. Rev.
455, 466 (1978) ("False words. . . undermine the voluntariness of the individual's con-
duct .... ").
213. In this third group of defenses, the consent was not improperly induced by the
promisee, and the person giving consent was capable of doing so. This, in part, may
help explain why courts are quite receptive to arguments by the promisee that the prom-
isor assumed the risk of the mistake, impracticability, or frustration. See E. Farnsworth,
supra note 13, §§ 9.3-.4, 9.6-.7, at 659-61, 666, 684-86, 692-94.
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such as misinformation, that vitiate the presence of consent. This re-
fusal to enforce some instances of apparent assent does not, however,
reflect a retreat to a subjective will theory. It remains true that an ob-
jective manifestation of intent to be legally bound is sufficient to give
rise to an enforceable commitment. The only qualification is that this
objective manifestation must have been voluntary. 21 4
A consent theory explains both the modem reception of the objec-
tive theory in the prima facie case of contractual obligation and the
traditional defenses to the prima facie case which are based on circum-
stances that in some significant fashion rebut the usual voluntary nature
of consent. When such circumstances are proved to have existed, even
a manifested assent to be legally bound does not justify enforcement.
CONCLUSION: A CONSENT THEORY IN PERSPECTIVE
A consent theory of contractual obligation views certain agree-
ments as legally binding because the parties bring to the transaction
certain rights and they manifest their assent to the transfer of these
rights. This approach accurately captures what is at stake when individ-
uals seek to exchange or bestow entitlements that they have acquired or
will acquire. It provides a coherent account of both the traditional
common law preference for an objective interpretation of contracts and
its exceptions.
A consent theory dictates both that a showing of consent is suffi-
cient (prima facie) to obtain enforcement and that defenses that show
circumstances which undermine the moral significance of objective con-
sent are warranted. A consent theory also provides a focus for contem-
porary dissatisfaction with the doctrine of consideration, while putting
into better perspective the recognized need to enforce some gratuitous
commitments and to protect some acts of reliance that were not bar-
gained for. What of the five "principles" of contract discussed in Part
I? A consent theory specifies the proper relationship among these core
concerns of contract law. In this way, it helps determine which princi-
ple or concern should be given priority in different situations.
A consent theory's concern with the issue of individual will and au-
tonomy is reflected in the manner by which consent is determined-the
theory looks for a manifestation of intention to be legally bound. Con-
tractual enforcement, therefore, will usually reflect the will of the par-
ties. Unlike a will theory, however, a consent theory explains the
enforcement of manifestations of assent that are contrary to the actual
intent of one party. A consent theory, like a reliance theory, legally
214. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 578:
A developed system of law. . . must draw some distinction between voluntary
and involuntary acts. . . . The whole of the modern law of contract, it may be
argued, thus does and should respond to the need of greater or finer discrimi-
nation in regard to the intentional character of acts. The law of error, duress
and fraud in contract would be unintelligible apart from such distinction.
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protects a promisee's reliance on a promisor's consent even in some in-
stances where a promisor did not subjectively intend to be bound. A
consent theory differs from a reliance theory by offering a workable cri-
terion independent of reliance itself2 15 to distinguish legally protected
from legally unprotected reliance.
A consent theory facilitates efficient resource distribution by legally
protecting consensual exchanges. Such consensual exchanges produce
vital and otherwise unavailable information about value and thereby
enable resources to gravitate to their highest value user. However, a
consent theory refuses to approve nonconsensual transfers regardless
of the alleged "efficiency" of such transfers. A consent theory also
avoids the extreme indeterminacy of a substantive fairness approach,
while protecting that concept offairness that is not a phantom-proce-
dural fairness-by its reliance on generally formulated principles of
contract formation and avoidance.
Finally, though a consent theory acknowledges that, under certain
circumstances, by bargaining and incurring unbargained-for detrimental
reliance parties can manifest assent to transfer rights, it also recognizes
the dependent relationship between contract theory and entitlement
theory. In this way, a consent theory avoids the dangers of basing con-
tractual obligation entirely on either bargain or reliance.
How does a consent theory fit into the typology of contract theo-
ries suggested in Part I? A consent theory of contract is an entitlements
theory and therefore it bases legal obligation upon the rights of the
parties. In contrast to one-sided party-based theories, a consent theory
stresses the interrelational function of contract law. The criterion of
enforceability-a manifested intention to be legally bound-respects
the interests of both parties. A corollary of the manifestation require-
ment is that the meaning of a promisor's conduct is interpreted from
the perspective of (reasonable) promisees. Requiring that it is an inten-
tion to be legally bound that must be manifested protects the autonomy
of promisors.
Further, a consent theory acknowledges that substantive concerns
arising at the level of entitlements-for example, a distinction between
alienable and inalienable rights-can affect the enforceability of certain
commitments. Yet a consent approach eschews the sorts of substantive
inquiries into and interference with ordinary contractual arrangements
that substance-based theories demand. Finally, a consent theory sup-
ports the traditional recognition that certain processes-such as bar-
gaining or using a seal-give rise to a heavy presumption of
enforceability. Unlike a process-based theory, a consent theory clearly
specifies its dependence on underlying notions of entitlements that en-
able a legal system to choose which processes to recognize and to know
when procedural requirements should be overridden.
215. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
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In describing the acceptance of new scientific theories, Thomas
Kuhn has noted that the fact that new theories cannot initially answer
all questions that may be put to them does not prevent them from sup-
planting old theories.216 Rather, new theories are accepted because
they explain known truths and resolve previously vexatious anomalies,
and provide promising new areas of research. 21 7 By these criteria, a
consent theory should be considered a potentially valuable approach to
explaining contractual obligation.
Still, the theory must be further extended and elaborated before it
can be fully evaluated. For example, the recognition that contractual
obligation is dependent on a deeper notion of individual entitlements
promises an explanation of why some rights might by their nature be
inalienable and therefore why some consensual agreements might be
unenforceable. This understanding may also assist in determining
which form of contract remedies-specific performance or monetary
damages-is appropriate if a contract is breached.218
The purpose of this Article is not to end discussion of contract
theory or doctrine, but rather to permit the ongoing discussion of con-
tractual obligation to emerge from its longstanding intellecutal cul-de-
sac and begin traveling a more productive course. If the "death of con-
tract" movement is a product of a disillusionment with and abandon-
ment of both the will theory of contract as a distinct source of
contractual obligation and the bargain theory of consideration as the
means of formally distinguishing between enforceable and unenforce-
able exercises of the will, the "resurrection of contract" is a recognition
of contract law's proper function as a transfer mechanism that is con-
ceptually dependent on more fundamental notions of individual entitle-
ments. A better understanding of contractual obligation should
ultimately result in rules and principles of contract that better facilitate
the important social need to make and rely upon enforceable commit-
ments. These and other promises of the consent theory await future
performance.
216. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 157-59 (2d ed. 1970).
217. Id. at 169.
218. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 99 (discussing how a consent theory of contract
and a proper distinction between alienable and inalienable rights suggest that the rules
governing choice of remedies should vary depending on which of three kinds of con-
tracts has been breached: a contract for external resources, a contract for personal serv-
ices, or a contract for corporate services).
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